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Exporting American Discovery
Yanbai Andrea Wang†
This Article presents the first comprehensive study of an intriguing and increasingly pervasive practice that is transforming civil litigation worldwide: US
judges now routinely compel discovery in this country and make it available for disputes and parties not before US courts. In the past decade and a half, federal courts
have received and granted thousands of such discovery requests for use in foreign
civil proceedings governed by different procedural rules. I call this global role played
by US courts the “export” of American discovery.
This Article compiles and analyzes a dataset of over three thousand foreign
discovery requests filed between 2005 and 2017 under 28 USC § 1782—an expansive
statute that is now the pivotal law governing the export of American discovery. I use
the dataset to show that the foreign civil demand for US discovery has approximately quadrupled during the study period, that demand from foreign private actors now overshadows demand from foreign tribunals, and that the requests’ countries of origin have diversified. I then map the ways in which the machinery of
domestic discovery is distorted in the context of global discovery, leading to missing
foreign stakeholders and systematic bias toward compelling discovery. Reflexively
exporting US discovery, in turn, undermines Supreme Court doctrine, risks imposing unintended externalities on foreign tribunals and foreign litigants, and erodes
universal notions of fairness and due process.
Although foreign discovery requests account for a small fraction of federal
dockets, they provide an illustrative case study of the larger phenomenon of disputes
straddling multiple legal systems. Litigants and attorneys are now strategizing
across borders and deploying national procedural tools to their global advantage.
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Yet, judges continue to operate within national silos even as they play a global role.
Consequently, judges are at an informational disadvantage when they adjudicate
disputes only parts of which are before them. This contemporary challenge calls for
institutional solutions in the form of court-to-court information sharing and coordination across borders, as well as a reconceptualization of federal judges as global
actors who share overlapping authority with foreign judges and arbitrators.
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“A curious quirk of our law is that American courts are not
limited to American disputes.”
–Then–Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal, Northern District of California1
“[T]he obvious question is well, why, don’t they have access to
that discovery vehicle in Argentina, why do they need access to this
little Reno office[?]”
–Then–Chief Judge Robert C. Jones, District of Nevada2
INTRODUCTION
Across the country, federal courts now routinely have a hand
in the resolution of foreign civil disputes. They do so by compelling discovery in the United States—typically as much discovery
as would be available for a lawsuit adjudicated in federal district
court—and making it available for use in foreign civil proceedings3 governed by different procedural rules. In the past decade
and a half, federal courts have received and granted thousands of
such discovery requests.4 They come from foreign courts and foreign parties.5 They seek discovery for cases ranging from billiondollar environmental controversies6 to the dissolution of

1

In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, 162 F Supp 3d 1029, 1032 (ND Cal 2016).
Transcript of Miscellaneous Hearing, Request for International Judicial Assistance from the National Court of First Instance in Labor Matters No 37 of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, No 3:12-cv-00662, *3 (D Nev filed Apr 13, 2013).
3
By foreign civil proceedings, I mean the full range of foreign civil dispute resolution proceedings for which discovery is now being requested in US federal courts, including
those before foreign and international courts, foreign regulatory agencies, as well as commercial and investor-state arbitral tribunals.
4
See Part II.
5
Id. By foreign parties, I mean any parties to foreign civil proceedings.
6
See, for example, Memorandum of Law in Support of the Republic of Ecuador and
Dr. Diego García Carrión’s Application for an Order Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to Issue a
Subpoena to John A. Connor for the Taking of a Deposition and the Production of Documents for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, In re Republic of Ecuador, No 4:11-mc-00516, *2
(SD Tex filed Nov 28, 2011).
2
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marriages,7 and in countries as varied as Chile,8 Romania,9 Iran,10
and South Korea.11 Since most of these requests are decided in
low-profile, unpublished orders buried in federal dockets around
the country, they have received little systematic attention from
scholars despite their transformative impact on the practice of
global litigation.12 Nearly every major law firm and numerous
smaller ones now advise clients and strategize around the availability of compelled discovery in the United States for use
abroad.13 Practitioners consider this feature of US law “an

7
See, for example, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Compel,
Kwong v Battery Tai-Shing Corp, No C 08-80142, *1–2 (ND Cal filed Feb 5, 2009).
8
See, for example, Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Order, Request for International Judicial Assistance from the 24th Civil Court of Santiago, Chile in
Juan Carols Said Kattan v Antonio Miguel Orlandini Said, No 1:17-mc-22657, *1 (SD Fla
filed July 17, 2017).
9
See, for example, Order, In re Request for International Judicial Assistance from
The First Instance Court, Calarasi, Romania; Matter of Ionela Camelia Buzduga v Constantin Viorel Buzduga, No 4:16-mc-01439, *3–4 (SD Tex filed July 4, 2016).
10 See, for example, Ex Parte Application, Without a Letter Rogatory Pursuant to
Title 28 U.S.C § 1782 for Discovery Ordered by Islamic Republic of Iran Kish Island, Department 102, Declaration of Counsel, Declaration of Defendant & Proposed Order,
Borhani v Ahmadi, No 8:16-mc-00021, *1–2 (CD Cal filed Sept 19, 2016).
11 See, for example, Ex Parte Order, In re Letter of Request for International Judicial
Assistance from the Seoul Central District Court, In the Matter of Subway International
B.V. v Kyung Hee Hwang, No 1:13-mc-00059, *1 (SDNY filed Feb 22, 2013).
12 Scholars writing on the subject have focused almost exclusively on high-profile
decisions and circuit splits. See notes 38–43 and accompanying text. There is one limited
systematic study of published decisions granting discovery for use in connection with foreign commercial arbitration, but it only examines a small number of unpublished decisions. See Kevin E. Davis, Helen Hershkoff, and Nathan Yaffe, Private Preference, Public
Process: U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign and International Arbitration *12–14 & nn 75–
77 (NYU School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 15-51, Oct 30, 2015)
(identifying twenty-two published opinions of this type).
13 See, for example, Duane Loft and Joshua Libling, Discovery in Aid of International
Proceedings: Recent Developments in Section 1782 (Boies Schiller Flexner, Oct 20, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/QU8U-M9BL; H. Christopher Boehning, Damiën F. Berkhout, and Peter Hering, The Consorcio Decision and the Need to Account for Discovery
Outside the Arbitration Procedure (International Bar Association Legal Practice Division,
Feb 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/2W24-EXE3; Claudia T. Salomon, David McLean,
Samuel B.C. de Villiers, and Eric M. Broad, US Court of Appeals Revises Opinion: Section 1782’s Use in Arbitration Ambiguous (Latham & Watkins, Feb 3, 2014), archived at
https://perma.cc/B5LL-FAL4.
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invaluable tool,”14 “a powerful strategic advantage,”15 and “a back
door” for foreign litigants16 that parties ignore “at their peril.”17
I call this growing global role played by US courts and judges
the “export” of American discovery.18 In today’s globalized world,
disputes increasingly cannot be confined to one legal system
alone. The fact that evidence relevant to a foreign dispute might
be located in and exported from the United States is a symptom
and symbol of this modern reality. The export of American discovery provides an illustrative case study of the institutional challenges that arise when disputes straddle contrasting legal systems.
For what is being exported is not just information—typically in the
form of witness testimony or the production of documents—that
may be submitted as evidence before a foreign tribunal. Along
with that information comes the compulsory power of US courts
and a set of procedures and litigation values found virtually nowhere else in the world.
American civil procedure is well recognized as being exceptional.19 Discovery in US federal courts is “far broader” in scope
than in other countries20 and is primarily conducted and controlled by the parties, rather than by judges.21 Expansive discovery is central to American litigation, and is intertwined with the
very mission of government in American society—one that is
more “reactive” and plays a smaller ex post role resolving disputes, rather than a larger ex ante role implementing state

14 Robert W. Gaffey and Bridget A. Crawford, Developments in U.S. Law Regarding
a More Liberal Approach to Discovery Requests Made by Foreign Litigants Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (Jones Day, Apr 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/WJL9-Y2CF.
15 Lyons Flood, Discovery In Aid of Foreign Proceedings, archived at https://
perma.cc/767Z-BFCT.
16 Christopher J. Houpt and Mark G. Hanchet, Section 1782 Discovery: A Back Door
for Foreign Litigants (Mayer Brown, Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/AL66-P94S.
17 Harout J. Samra, US Courts Affirm Expansive Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
(DLA Piper, Sept 29, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/9C6B-PBWF.
18 As explained below, “export” here occurs on a case-by-case basis, and with the participation of foreign courts or foreign private actors.
19 See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (Harvard
2001) (“Compared to other economically advanced democracies, American civic life is more
deeply pervaded by legal conflict and by controversy about legal processes.”). See also generally Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American
Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877 (Yale 2017) (recounting the nineteenth-century origins of the idea of American legal exceptionalism); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American
Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 Am J Comp L 709 (2005).
20 Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 594 (7th Cir 2011).
21 See Part III.A.
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programs.22 Outside the United States—where litigation may perform a different function in regulating society—American discovery is regarded as excessive and has been approached with skepticism and animosity.23
Operating across different discovery systems offers private
actors opportunities for arbitrage. Seeking US discovery is typically straightforward. One files a request with the federal district
court where the discovery target is located. That request is usually entertained and granted with minimal judicial activity and
on an ex parte basis—without the participation of the foreign opposing party or the foreign tribunal before which the discovery is
to be used. The target of the request is then subpoenaed and ordered to produce discovery according to the scope and practices of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The target might
happen to be the foreign opposing party or might choose to voluntarily alert the foreign opposing party, who might in turn inform
the foreign tribunal, but that does not always happen. The foreign
opposing party and the foreign tribunal might never know that
one side of the case was built using different discovery practices
than those governing the remainder of the dispute.
These requests generate complications for both the foreign
opposing party and the foreign tribunal. Take the example of a
discovery request filed in the Northern District of Alabama by a
private actor seeking discovery from a US bank for a contemplated lawsuit in the British Virgin Islands. 24 Such prefiling

22 See Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process 71–96 (Yale 1986) (describing two orientations of government: the “activist” state, which pursues its vision of the good life through policy implementation and tends toward legal institutions that are hierarchical judicial bureaucracies;
and the “reactive” state, which provides a framework for its citizens to pursue their own
goals and tends toward legal institutions that are more like that of the United States). See
also Kagan, Adversarial Legalism at 3 (cited in note 19) (describing legal process in the
United States as “adversarial legalism,” meaning “policymaking, policy implementation,
and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation”); Diego A. Zambrano,
Discovery as Regulation, 119 Mich L Rev *25–27, 32–34 (forthcoming 2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/W8DS-7B7D (arguing that American discovery serves regulatory goals by
relying on private litigants to enforce important statutes).
23 See, for example, James H. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 Intl Law 5,
5 (1979) (noting that the “virtually boundless sweep of the pre-trial procedures presently
permitted by many American courts is so completely alien to the procedure in most other
jurisdictions that an attitude of suspicion and hostility is created”).
24 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Bracha Foundation’s Application for an
Order Granting Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Bracha Foundation Request for Discovery Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782, No 2:15-mc-00748, *1–2 & n 1
(ND Ala filed May 1, 2015) (Bracha Foundation Discovery Application Memo).
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discovery requests are permitted under 28 USC § 178225—an expansive federal statute written in the 1960s that is now the pivotal law governing the export of discovery. The request was initially granted ex parte and a subpoena was served on the bank,
which was not a party to the contemplated suit. Months after the
request was granted and the subpoena served, the anticipated opposing party moved to intervene, arguing denial of due process
because the company was never informed of the request at the
time the court considered it. In fact, similar discovery requests
had been made in three additional US district courts without
alerting the opposing party.26 The Northern District of Alabama
nevertheless declined to vacate the discovery order. 27 This fact
pattern is common, and there is no effective procedural mechanism for ensuring symmetrical discovery when one side benefits
from broad US discovery while the other is limited to the more
restrictive procedures of the foreign tribunal.
Consider also the example of the European Commission filing
an amicus brief before the US Supreme Court in 2003 to prevent
a district court in the Northern District of California from compelling the production of evidence, ostensibly in its aid.28 At the
time, the European Commission was investigating an antitrust
complaint brought by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) against its
worldwide competitor, Intel.29 When the Commission declined
AMD’s suggestion that it seek certain documents from Intel, AMD
asked the Northern District of California, the jurisdiction where
Intel is headquartered, to subpoena Intel for that same information.30 The request eventually reached the Supreme Court,
25

Act of Oct 3, 1964, Pub L No 88-619, 78 Stat 995 (1964), codified at 28 USC § 1782.
See Bracha Foundation Discovery Application Memo at *1–2 n 1 (cited in note 24)
(explaining that the private actor commenced a related action in the British Virgin Islands
and filed similar discovery applications in the United States District Courts for the Southern
District of New York, the Southern District of Florida, and the Northern District of Ohio).
27 See In re Application of Bracha Foundation Request for Discovery Pursuant to 28
USC § 1782, 2015 WL 6123204, *1 (ND Ala) (explaining that “the use of ex parte § 1782
applications is widespread and that granting them is not improper based on their ex parte
nature”).
28 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Communities Supporting
Reversal, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–6 (US filed Dec 23,
2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23138389) (European Commission Brief).
29 European Commission, 37.990 Intel *12–19 (2009), archived at https://
perma.cc/9MWQ-XTE8.
30 AMD’s Application for Order Directing Intel to Produce Documents Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Use in European Commission, Case No. Comp/C3-37.990 –
AMD/Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, No 01-7033, *1–3 (ND Cal filed Oct
1, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 35995385).
26
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where the European Commission argued that granting AMD’s request in the United States would be a “direct interference” with
the Commission’s own “orderly process” and would undermine its
policies, increase its workload, and divert its enforcement resources.31 The Commission protested: “[we do not] want to be used
as a pawn by . . . private entities seeking to employ [American]
processes . . . to obtain . . . discovery that’s available under no
other circumstances.”32
These two cases illustrate the consequences that American
discovery can have for foreign courts and foreign parties—consequences that were not intended by Congress or by the Supreme
Court. When Congress first enacted § 1782 in its current form, it
believed the statute to be “the kind of assistance that is likely to
be preferred abroad,”33 and advised federal courts to consider the
“character” of the foreign proceeding and the “nature and attitudes” of the foreign country and tribunal.34 When the Supreme
Court took up the dispute between Intel and AMD, it further directed district courts to avoid offense to foreign courts and to maintain an appropriate level of parity between foreign litigants.35
Based on factors set out by the Court,36 the Northern District of
California denied AMD’s discovery request on remand, given the
European Commission’s expressed rejection of US discovery.37
Yet, the export of American discovery has also been described
as “legal imperialism”38 and “officious intermeddl[ing].”39 And this
Article’s empirical and doctrinal analyses confirm that federal
31 Transcript of Oral Argument, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02572, *18, 21–22 (US filed Apr 20, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 954709).
32 Id at *21.
33 Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum L
Rev 1015, 1018 (1965). Hans Smit, professor at Columbia Law School, served as the reporter to the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure that drafted the
current version of § 1782. See id at 1015.
34 Judicial Procedures in Litigation with International Aspects, S Rep No 88-1580,
88th Cong, 2d Sess § 9 at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 USCCAN 3782, 3788.
35 See Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, 542 US 241, 261 (2004) (noting that
comity and parity are “important [ ] touchstones for a district court’s exercise of discretion
in particular cases”).
36 These factors include whether the foreign court needs and is receptive to US discovery, and whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering
restrictions.” Id at 264–65.
37 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 2004 WL 2282320, *1 (ND Cal).
38 Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50
Cath U L Rev 591, 624 (2001).
39 Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
Toward a New World Order?, 7 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 153, 193 (1999).
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judges are not able to apply the Supreme Court’s instructions in
practice. Some pinpoint the problem as § 1782’s conferral of broad
discretion on federal judges,40 though there is much disagreement
over how that discretion should be narrowed.41 Others contend
that the export of American discovery violates the separation of
powers in the United States,42 and that it is a unilateral fix for a
set of issues that call for a multilateral solution.43 While a treaty
governing the international exchange of evidence—the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”)—was signed in

40 See Brian Eric Bomstein and Julie M. Levitt, Comment, Much Ado About 1782: A
Look at Recent Problems with Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 429, 431–32 (1989) (explaining that
the “nearly unbridled discretion” exercised by district courts under 28 USC § 1782 in deciding whether to aid foreign fact-finding “is the root of the problem[ ]”); Marat A. Massen,
Discovery for Foreign Proceedings After Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis
of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence, 83 S Cal L Rev 875, 877 (2010) (noting that most academic criticism of 28 USC § 1782 and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that statute
has focused on granting “judges too much discretion for evaluating” foreign discovery requests).
41 Proposals include a default rule that requests be denied when they seek discovery
for certain types of foreign proceedings, most notably commercial arbitrations, and that
requests be granted only when the sought-after discovery would be discoverable in the
foreign proceeding in which it is to be used. Courts and academics are split on whether
§ 1782 permits the export of discovery to commercial arbitral tribunals, and the latter
proposal was rejected as a bright-line rule by the Supreme Court. Compare In re: Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F3d 710, 723 (6th Cir 2019)
(holding that private commercial arbitral tribunals are covered by § 1782); Servotronics,
Inc v Boeing Co, 954 F3d 209, 214–16 (4th Cir 2020) (same), with Republic of Kazakhstan
v Biedermann International, 168 F3d 880, 881–83 (5th Cir 1999) (holding that private
commercial arbitral tribunals are not covered by § 1782); National Broadcasting Company, Inc v Bear Stearns & Co, 165 F3d 184, 191 (2d Cir 1999) (same). See also, for example, New York City Bar Association Committee on International Commercial Disputes, 28
U.S.C. § 1782 as a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International Commercial Arbitration—Applicability and Best Practices 19–25 (2008), archived at https://perma.cc/
FUP4-K2JD (describing the circuit split).
42 See David J. Gerber, Obscured Visions: Policy, Power, and Discretion in Transnational Discovery, 23 Vand J Transnatl L 993, 1007 (1991) (noting that the excessive discretion exercised by judges in responding to foreign discovery requests inappropriately
“shifts the available use of United States power from the executive and legislative
branches to the judiciary”).
43 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 L & Contemp Probs 103, 135–39 (1994) (criticizing the
United States’ historical preference for a unilateral approach that is “hard to justify, even
in purely practical terms, in a world that is increasingly interdependent and in which our
economic strength is waning”).
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1970,44 it is widely considered to be ineffective,45 leading some to
demand further efforts to forge procedural uniformity across nations46 and others to bemoan the futility of seeking convergence
given the vast procedural differences worldwide. 47 Needless to
say, there is no consensus on whether the export of American discovery is working, and, if not, where the problems lie and what
an alternative system for sharing evidence would look like.
I argue that the export of American discovery is in need of
reform. Its most pressing shortcoming is its failure to include and
to provide due process to the appropriate actors. When discovery
is exported, it has ripple effects for foreign adversaries against
whom the evidence is to be used, and for the foreign tribunal overseeing the dispute. Yet, there is no established mechanism for informing or involving those entities. Instead, federal judges have
remained at arm’s length from the very foreign proceedings they
are influencing, and have engaged in the impossible task of abstractly weighing foreign interests with no foreign input. The
problem, therefore, is not an excess of discretion, but a shortage
of information. This problem can be addressed in the immediate
term through shifts in judicial practice, and in the medium term
through changes to the FRCP and amendments to § 1782. In the
long term, a broader reconceptualization of the global role played
by federal judges—and the global space in which they operate—
is needed.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the centrality of § 1782 to the export of discovery. The statute allows foreign tribunals and foreign private actors to seek US discovery directly from federal district courts. In interpreting the statute, the
Supreme Court instructed district courts to consider a foreign tribunal’s need for and receptivity to US discovery, and to maintain

44 The United States has ratified the Hague Evidence Convention. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, HCCH Members, archived at https://perma.cc/
QC9R-7J5Q.
45 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132 (cited in note 43) (noting that the
Hague Evidence Convention “has been a disappointment to many countries that ratified
it and a source of controversy and friction”).
46 See James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention After
Aerospatiale, 38 Tex Intl L J 103, 116 (2003) (noting the “need for uniform procedures or
at least procedural standards” given the Hague Evidence Convention’s failure to bridge
international differences in discovery procedures).
47 See Marcus, 7 Tulane J Intl & Comp L at 199 (cited in note 39) (arguing that
despite US reforms to constrain discovery in recent decades, “a new world order that fits
the American reality and also commands the respect of the rest of the industrialized world
is probably a thing of the remote future so far as discovery is concerned”).
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an appropriate measure of parity between the parties.48 The statute’s implementation by lower courts is now fractured along many
lines, exposing confusion surrounding the statute’s purpose and
scope, as well as its intended effect on foreign tribunals and the
parties before them.
Part II provides a comprehensive, nationwide, descriptive account of how foreign discovery requests have operated in district
courts. I compiled a dataset of over three thousand foreign discovery requests filed under § 1782 between 2005 and 2017, approximately two thousand of which are for use in civil proceedings
abroad. Relying on the dataset, I show that the foreign civil demand for US discovery has approximately quadrupled in that
time, and that their countries of origin have diversified. Demand
from foreign parties now overshadows demand from foreign tribunals, with private actors making more complex and creative
strategic uses of US procedures across borders. Overall, the grant
rate is very high (94 percent in 2015) while the contestation rate
is relatively low (22 percent in 2015), calling into question
whether US judges are serving as effective discovery gatekeepers
for disputes in foreign tribunals.
Part III performs a doctrinal evaluation of the export of American discovery and concludes that US judges are at a severe informational disadvantage when fielding requests from foreign parties. It is assumed that the machinery of domestic discovery can be
extended to exported discovery, but the discretion and expertise
exercised by federal courts in the domestic context cannot be transferred to discovery requests from foreign parties due to the absence
of critical actors and the lack of relevant information. Consequently, federal judges have devised shortcuts for the analyses
they conduct, which in turn place a heavy thumb on the scale for
granting discovery. Those shortcuts not only undercut congressional intent and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1782,
but also pose larger normative problems by eroding comity, adverseness, and basic notions of due process and fairness. By contrast, the discretion and expertise exercised by federal courts in
the domestic context is inapposite for discovery requests from foreign tribunals, the vast majority of which are governed by treaty.
Part IV proposes several reforms. I advocate for more active
judicial management of § 1782 requests that systematically seeks
out the participation of foreign opposing parties and foreign

48

See Intel, 542 US at 262–65.
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tribunals. I also recommend restructuring § 1782 requests so that
each foreign discovery request is no longer filed as a stand-alone
US case—a feature that makes these requests uniquely difficult
to administer.
Finally, I conclude that this study of § 1782 and its unaccounted-for foreign impacts suggest broader challenges that
courts face when disputes straddle multiple legal systems. Litigants and attorneys are adapting to the transnational nature of
litigation by strategizing across borders and deploying national
procedural tools to their global advantage. Meanwhile, judges are
increasingly at an informational disadvantage as they continue
to operate within national silos, adjudicating disputes, only parts
of which are before them. These challenges call for institutional
solutions in the form of court-to-court information sharing and
coordination across borders, as well as a shift toward reconceptualizing federal judges as global actors who share overlapping authority with foreign judges and arbitrators.
I. THE MECHANICS OF EXPORT
This Part sets out the mechanics, governing laws, and institutional actors engaged in the export of discovery. The United
States has been offering some form of exported discovery since the
mid-nineteenth century. Today, 28 USC § 1782 is the key governing statute. It provides the broadest and most direct access to US
discovery, and it is also used internally by the Department of Justice to execute discovery requests made through two indirect
routes—the traditional system of letters rogatory and the Hague
Evidence Convention. This Part describes the three existing
paths to US discovery, highlights the centrality of § 1782, and examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute.
A.

Three Paths to US Discovery
1. Letters rogatory.

The traditional “letter rogatory”—a formal request to perform a judicial act sent from the court of one country, typically
through diplomatic channels, to the court of another country49—
is the oldest mechanism for obtaining discovery assistance in the

49 See Gary B. Born and Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United
States Courts 1024 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed 2011).
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United States.50 It continues to operate today, with the Department of State and Department of Justice acting as intermediaries
for executing them.51 Internationally, letters rogatory are fulfilled
on a discretionary basis and as a matter of international comity.52
Domestically, they are accorded the same more favorable treatment as requests made under the Hague Evidence Convention,53
described below.
Because letters rogatory originate with a request from a foreign court (rather than a party to a foreign suit), the receptivity
of that court to US discovery assistance is assured. Letters rogatory have been criticized for being unwieldy, time-consuming, and
costly.54 They typically travel from the requesting court in a foreign country, to that country’s ministry of foreign affairs, then to
that country’s embassy in the United States,55 then to the US Department of State, and then to the Office of International Judicial
Assistance (OIJA) in the Department of Justice. OIJA screens the
request for straightforward technical requirements, attempts to
secure the requested discovery voluntarily, and in the absence of
voluntary compliance, submits the request to a district court, 56
which then relies on § 1782 for execution. Once compelled, the
discovery travels back to the requesting court via the same path.
The State Department estimates that this process can take a year
or more and recommends use of more “[s]treamlined procedures,”

50 See Act of Mar 2, 1855, ch 140, § 2, 10 Stat 630 (empowering federal courts to
subpoena witnesses under letters rogatory).
51 See 28 USC § 1781(a)(1):

The Department of State has power, directly, or through suitable channels . . .
to receive a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal, to transmit it to the tribunal, officer, or agency in the United States to
whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after execution.
52 See 22 CFR § 92.54 (2019) (noting that letters rogatory requests “rest entirely
upon the comity of courts toward each other, and customarily embody a pro mise of reciprocity”); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 Colum L Rev
2071, 2078 (2015) (defining international comity).
53 Telephone Interview with Katerina Ossenova, Office of International Judicial Assistance, Department of Justice (Feb 13, 2019) (Ossenova Interview).
54 See 22 CFR § 22.1 (2013) (listing $2,275 as the fee for processing a letter rogatory);
Donald Earl Childress III, Michael D. Ramsey, and Christopher A. Whytock, Transnational Law and Practice 941 (Wolters Kluwer 2015) (explaining that processing is “frequently [ ] delayed by poor diplomatic relations, bureaucratic inertia, and conflicts with
public policy”).
55 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration 1017 (Thomson West 3d ed 2006).
56 Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53).
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such as an international treaty or a direct petition to a court,
when possible.57
2. 28 USC § 1782.
During the years following World War II, a surge in international business and other cross-border activities led to a “flood of
litigation” in the United States with international elements.58
American lawyers, frustrated by procedural differences between
the United States and the civil law countries of Europe and Latin
America, called for “a modernization of international legal procedure.”59 With the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, American lawyers
were accustomed to a liberal, party-driven system of discovery
aimed at uncovering the “fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial.”60 Yet, in other countries they were forbidden from taking evidence directly,61 and had to rely on letters rogatory, which they found to be “inefficient, time consuming, and
costly.”62 Some jurisdictions, like Germany and the Netherlands,
would not compel the testimony of unwilling witnesses even when
a letter rogatory was issued.63 And testimony secured through a
letter rogatory might not be usable in the United States due to
noncompliance with domestic requirements such as examination
under oath and oral questioning by an attorney.64
Congress enacted a number of measures to address these
challenges. To facilitate the import of discovery, Congress

57 Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Preparation of Letters Rogatory,
archived at https://perma.cc/JCE4-Y6V3.
58 See Proposed Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, S 1890, 85th Cong, 1st Sess, in 103 Cong Rec S 5726 (Apr 16, 1957)
(noting that cases with “international ramifications” included “cases in which judicial documents must be served abroad, records or witnesses examined within the territory of a
foreign state, or in which proof must be offered of the law prevailing in a foreign jurisdiction”).
59 Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, S Rep No 85-2392, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 USCCAN 5201,
5201–02. See also Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 110–11 (cited in note 43).
60 Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 501 (1947).
61 In some countries like Switzerland, it is a criminal infringement of state sovereignty for a private party to take evidence. S Rep No 85-2392 at 2 (cited in note 58) (“In
some jurisdictions, notably Switzerland, there is [a] considerable question whether such a
procedure might constitute a penal offense on the assumption that it would be regarded
as an illegal usurpation of judicial functions.”).
62 S 1890, 103 Cong Rec at S 5726 (cited in note 58).
63 See id.
64 See S Rep No 85-2392 at 2 (cited in note 59); Childress, Ramsey, and Whytock,
Transnational Law and Practice at 940 (cited in note 54); Born and Rutledge, International Civil Litigation at 1025 (cited in note 49).
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authorized federal courts to subpoena and to hold in contempt an
American citizen or resident in a foreign country.65 The FRCP
were revised to specify how testimony could be taken abroad,66
and permitted district courts to order the production of documents, regardless of location, so long as they are in the “possession, custody, or control” of a party to a US proceeding or a nonparty witness over whom the court has jurisdiction.67
To facilitate the export of discovery, Congress passed 28 USC
§ 1782 in 194868 and rewrote it in 1964.69 The statute reads:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or
to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal. . . . The order may be
made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made,
by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application
of any interested person and may direct that the testimony
or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. . . . The order
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in
whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or
statement or producing the document or other thing. To the
extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other
thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.70
In 1996, the statute was revised to include discovery for use in criminal investigations71—a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
At the time of the 1964 revision, the statute was considered
“a major step in bringing the United States to the forefront of
nations.”72 It was thought to provide “equitable and efficacious
65 See Act of June 25, 1948 §§ 1783–84, 62 Stat 869, 949–50, codified at 28 USC
§§ 1783–84.
66 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 112–13 (cited in note 43) (describing
amendments to Rule 28(b) in 1963).
67 FRCP 34, 45.
68 The 1948 version authorized district courts to depose “any witness residing within
the United States [for] use[ ] in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country
with which the United States is at peace.” Act of June 25, 1948, § 1782, 62 Stat at 949.
69 Act of Oct 3, 1964 § 9, 78 Stat at 997.
70 28 USC § 1782(a).
71 Act of Feb 10, 1996, Pub L No 104-106, 110 Stat 486, 486.
72 S Rep No 88-1580 at 2, 13 (cited in note 34).
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procedures” for foreign tribunals and litigants, and to meet the
“requirements of foreign practice and procedure.” 73 Congress
hoped that foreign countries would reciprocate by providing US
litigants with easy access to foreign discovery.74 Despite these
aspirations, many have observed that foreign countries have not
in fact reciprocated. 75
3. Hague Evidence Convention.
While these domestic policies were being put into place, it
was also recognized that the problems arising from international
litigation needed an international response. During the late
1960s, the United States led the negotiations for the Hague Evidence Convention, which was adopted in 1970 and entered into
force for the United States in 1972.76 It operates through “Letters
of Request,” which are issued by the judicial authority of one contracting state to the designated “Central Authority” of another,
and then to the proper domestic authority for execution.77 Within
the United States, OIJA serves as the Central Authority.78 Once
a request reaches OIJA, it is carried out in the same way regardless of whether it is a request under the Hague Evidence Convention or a letter rogatory from a non-Convention country.79 OIJA
screens the request, attempts to secure the evidence voluntarily,
and then forwards the request to the appropriate federal district
court for compelled discovery under § 1782.80 Since requests must
originate from a foreign judicial authority (rather than from a
party), receptivity of that authority to US discovery is assured.
The Convention was initially presented to the US Senate and
to bar associations as requiring other countries to make concessions while not necessitating significant changes domestically
given the existence of the more powerful § 1782.81 It is now in force
73

Id at 2, 7.
Id at 13.
75 See, for example, Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 136 (cited in note 43) (lamenting that § 1782 “reflect[s] the naive view that if the United States were generous,
other countries would follow its lead”); Lien, 50 Cath U L Rev at 631 (cited in note 38)
(noting that “the invitation [to follow the US example in liberal export] has been declined”).
76 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 23
UST 2555, 2555–56, TIAS No 7444 (1970) (Hague Evidence Convention).
77 Hague Evidence Convention Arts 1–2, 23 UST at 2557–58.
78 Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53).
79 Except that there are typically no fees associated with a request coming from a
Hague Evidence Convention state party. Id.
80 Id.
81 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132–33 (cited in note 43).
74
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between the United States and fifty-four countries.82 Many have
commented that it has failed to achieve its intended purpose of
bridging the gap between the United States and civil law countries.83 All but a handful of contracting states have adopted a declaration that they will not execute letters of request seeking pretrial discovery of documents as is common in the United States.84
Meanwhile, observing that the Convention’s procedures “would
be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain
to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules,”
the Supreme Court concluded in 1987 that the Convention is not
the exclusive or even the required first resort procedure for American litigants seeking evidence abroad.85 Instead, a US court may
continue to unilaterally compel extraterritorial discovery from
those subject to its jurisdiction86—a practice resented by foreign
countries.87 There remains no effective international agreement
governing discovery across borders, and some suggest that the
United States should denounce the Hague Evidence Convention.88
82 There are sixty-three contracting states overall. The Convention has entered into
force between the United States and all but three of the other contracting states. See
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Evidence Convention – Acceptances of Accessions (Apr 21, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/QHB8-SPXE.
83 See, for example, Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration at 1052
(cited in note 55) (noting that the “conflict over the Hague Evidence Convention appears
as a kind of replay of the overall conflict about American-style litigation, and in particular
about American-style discovery”).
84 See Hague Evidence Convention Art 23, 23 UST at 2568 (“A Contracting State
may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as
known in Common Law countries.”). The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention explains that Article 23 does not apply to all requests for production of
documents from common law countries during the pretrial discovery phase, but only to
those that are not “sufficiently substantiated so as to avoid ‘fishing expeditions.’” See
Hague Convention on Private International Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of
the Evidence Convention (3d ed 2016).
85 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 US 522, 542 (1987).
86 Aérospatiale left judges to conduct an open-ended, “particularized analysis” to determine whether first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention is required. Id at 543–44.
See also Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 Stan L Rev 941, 946–47 (2017) (finding
that this particularized analysis has resulted in federal judges almost never requiring parties to use the Hague Evidence Convention to obtain foreign discovery from other parties).
87 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442, Reporters’ Note 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond
the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”).
88 See Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S Tex L Rev
215, 227 (1994) (“While the ruling that the [Hague Evidence] Convention is nonexclusive
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The Centrality of 28 USC § 1782

These three paths to US discovery now overlap. A foreign tribunal seeking discovery in the United States may either use letters rogatory, the indirect path of the Hague Evidence Convention, or the direct path of § 1782. Similarly, a foreign private actor
may either indirectly ask the relevant foreign tribunal to send a
request, or directly request it from a federal district court under
§ 1782, bypassing the foreign tribunal and other intermediary national authorities. Within the United States, all requests are ultimately executed by federal district courts under § 1782.89 Section 1782’s statutory language does not differentiate between
direct requests and indirect requests, or between requests from
foreign tribunals and those from foreign private actors.
Direct requests from foreign private actors have caused the
most complications and are the source of nearly all appeals in the
past decade.90 Some scholars argue that permitting private actors
to access US discovery was a “dramatic departure” from the traditional notion that judicial assistance is provided by one court to
another.91 In particular, courts have struggled with the question
of how they should weigh a foreign tribunal’s receptivity to US
discovery. Section 1782’s statutory language does not shed light
on this question, but the statute’s legislative history notes that
federal district courts should consider “the nature and attitudes
of the government of the country from which the request emanates and the character of the proceedings in that country” when
granting or denying a § 1782 application.92
In 2004, the Supreme Court considered whether sought-after
discovery must be discoverable abroad for it to be discoverable
under § 1782—a shorthand for determining receptivity that had
is to be welcomed, and a different ruling would have been calamitous, it would nevertheless be preferable to denounce the Convention.”). See also Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 Va J Intl L 597, 599
(1990) (indicating that “litigation regarding discovery in the United States for use abroad
has turned on the proper interpretation and application of section 1782, not on the interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention”).
89 See 28 USC § 1782.
90 See, for example, Kiobel by Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F3d
238, 240–41 (2d Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S Ct 852 (2019); Grupo Mexico SAB de CV v
SAS Asset Recovery, Ltd, 821 F3d 573, 573–75 (5th Cir 2016); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v
Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 593–94 (7th Cir 2011); Suzlon Energy Ltd v Microsoft Corp, 671
F3d 726, 727–28 (9th Cir 2011).
91 Born and Rutledge, International Civil Litigation at 1066 (cited in note 49) (asking
whether it is “wise for § 1782 to provide judicial assistance at the request of foreign litigants”).
92 S Rep No 88-1580 at 7 (cited in note 34).
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been adopted by some courts.93 The Supreme Court rejected the
foreign discoverability requirement in Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc,94 a case in which the discovery sought by a private actor under § 1782 was not discoverable abroad and expressly not wanted by the foreign tribunal at issue: the European
Commission.95 The Commission filed an amicus brief explaining
that the discovery would give AMD access to documents it is not
permitted to review under European law, would undermine the
Commission’s policies on confidential information, and would increase its workload and divert its enforcement resources. 96 Section 1782, the Commission argued, could “become a threat to foreign sovereigns if interpreted expansively.”97 Several industry
associations filed amicus briefs expressing concern that compelling discovery under § 1782 that is not discoverable abroad could
produce unfair outcomes when US-style discovery benefits one
side of a dispute but not the other.98 The Department of Justice
filed an amicus brief supporting a broad interpretation of § 1782
since it relies on the statute to execute letters rogatory and letters
of request under the Hague Evidence Convention.99
The Supreme Court reasoned that a foreign discovery restriction does not necessarily translate into an objection to exported discovery from the United States.100 Instead, the Court
enumerated four discretionary factors for district courts to consider: (1) whether the requested evidence is available without
93 See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F2d 1, 7 (1st Cir 1992); In re Request
for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F2d 1151, 1156
(11th Cir 1988). But see Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 292 F3d 664, 668–69
(9th Cir 2002) (rejecting a foreign discoverability requirement); In re Bayer AG, 146 F3d
188, 193–96 (3d Cir 1998) (same); Euromepa S.A. v R. Esmerian, Inc, 51 F3d 1095, 1099–
1100 (2d Cir 1995) (same).
94 542 US 241 (2004).
95 Id at 250–54.
96 See European Commission Brief at *4, 15–16 (cited in note 28).
97 Id at *2.
98 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae In
Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–3 (US filed
Nov 15, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 23112944); Brief of Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *2–3 (US filed Dec 31, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003
WL 23112943). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers
in Support of Petitioner, Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *8–11 (US
filed Nov 15, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 32157392).
99 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Intel
Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, No 02-572, *1–2, 11–13 (US filed Jan 30, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 214306).
100 See Intel, 542 US at 261–62.

2108

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:2029

§ 1782; (2) whether the foreign government or court is receptive
to US federal court judicial assistance; (3) whether the request
“conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United
States”; and (4) whether the request is unduly burdensome or intrusive.101 The Supreme Court explained that these factors, as
well as the exercise of judicial discretion more generally, could
safeguard comity. Similarly, parity between the foreign adversaries could be maintained either by the district court conditioning its grant of discovery, or by the foreign tribunal conditioning
its acceptance of US discovery, on a reciprocal exchange of information.102 On remand, the Northern District of California denied
the discovery request given the European Commission’s amicus
brief expressing resistance to US discovery.103
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 2004, lower courts’ implementation of § 1782 have continued to fracture along many
lines. Most prominently, the Courts of Appeals now disagree on
whether the statute can be used to compel discovery in aid of foreign commercial arbitrations. The Seventh Circuit recently held
that § 1782 does not extend to private international commercial
arbitrations, placing it in agreement with the Second and Fifth
Circuits and in conflict with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.104
Lower courts also disagree on whether § 1782 can be used to compel documents physically located abroad but under the possession, custody, or control of a US entity.105 Further complicating
the matter, entrepreneurial litigants now use discovery obtained
through § 1782 in multiple proceedings before multiple tribunals
once the statute’s requirements are deemed satisfied with respect

101

Id at 264–65.
See id at 262.
103 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc v Intel Corp, 2004 WL 2282320, *2–3 (ND Cal).
104 See Servotronics, Inc v Rolls-Royce PLC, No 19-1847, slip op at *15 (7th Cir Sept
22, 2020); In re Guo, 965 F3d 96, 104–06 (2d Cir 2020); El Paso Corp v La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F Appx 31, 33–34 (5th Cir 2009); In re Application
to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F3d 710, 717–730 (6th Cir 2019);
Servotronics, Inc v Boeing Co, 954 F3d 209, 210 (4th Cir 2020).
105 See Sergeeva v Tripleton International Ltd, 834 F3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir 2016)
(holding that § 1782 reaches “responsive documents and information located outside the
United States” so long as it is within the “possession, custody, or control of” the discovery
target); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F3d 520, 524 (2d Cir 2019) (holding that “there is no per
se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782”). But see Pinchuk v Chemstar Products
LLC, 2014 WL 2990416, *4 (D Del) (quashing a discovery request for documents located
abroad).
102
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to one foreign proceeding.106 These are just a few of the developments that expose persistent confusion surrounding the statute’s
purpose and scope, as well as its intended effect on foreign tribunals and the parties before them.107
II. EVIDENCE FROM FEDERAL DOCKETS
This Part presents the findings of the first nationwide study
of foreign discovery requests in federal district courts. Despite anecdotal reports that foreign discovery requests have experienced
“a groundswell of popularity,”108 there have been no attempts to
systematically investigate recent trends in the overall number of
requests, or their nature, origins, and outcome. I fill this gap by
compiling and analyzing the most exhaustive existing dataset of
requests for discovery to be used in civil disputes abroad.
The number of discovery requests for use in foreign civil proceedings received by district courts has indeed surged, approximately quadrupling between 2005 and 2017. Their countries of
origin have diversified, suggesting that the historical concern
about procedural differences between the United States and the
civil law countries within Western Europe and South America
may not be as central as it used to be. Meanwhile, there is a growing need to understand legal systems in Asia and Eastern Europe.
The vast majority of requests fall into two categories: indirect
requests from foreign courts and direct requests from foreign parties. In other words, foreign parties now have a more direct relationship with US district courts than do foreign tribunals. Moreover, demand from foreign parties now overshadows demand from
foreign tribunals in both number and complexity of requests.
Whereas foreign tribunal requests are fairly straightforward,
homogenous, and most frequently connected to family law matters, foreign party requests are more sophisticated, varied, and
most frequently connected to commercial matters. These divergences suggest that there are different dynamics at play in these
106 This development has gained traction since the Second Circuit held in 2017 that
§ 1782 “does not prevent an applicant who lawfully has obtained discovery under the statute with respect to one foreign proceeding form using the discovery elsewhere unless the
district court orders otherwise.” In re Accent Delight International Ltd, 869 F3d 121, 135
(2d Cir 2017).
107 See Part III.C.
108 Globalization Spurs Use of USC 1782 for U.S. Discovery in Foreign Disputes
(Bloomberg Law, Feb 17, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/L56T-2TL7. See also Geoffrey
Kertesz, Section 1782: American Dream . . . or Nightmare?, 22 Trusts & Trustees 293, 297
(2016) (“If the reported cases are any indication, use of the statute is on the rise.”).
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two sets of requests. Whether US judges are serving as effective
discovery gatekeepers in each type of request is examined in the
next Part.
Analysis of federal dockets is also illuminating for what it
cannot reveal. Requests are typically considered ex parte, without
informing or including the foreign tribunal or foreign opposing
party, though occasionally notice is given in haphazard ways. For
reasons explained below, it was not possible to systematically
track when notification was provided to the foreign tribunal or
foreign opposing party and therefore when a foreign tribunal was
aware that a US discovery request had been made. Because I
could not track foreign tribunal awareness of a US discovery request being made by a foreign party, it was also not possible to
determine how often and which foreign courts tended to welcome
or resist sought-after discovery. Finally, docket analysis provides
an incomplete picture of when multiple US discovery requests are
made for the same foreign proceeding, and no information about
what happens after a request is granted. Federal judges make
foreign discovery decisions in the absence of this information.
A.

Data Overview

I compiled a dataset composed of over three thousand discovery requests, filed between January 1, 2005 and December 31,
2017, seeking compelled discovery under § 1782 for use in foreign
proceedings. Since § 1782 authorizes discovery requests for foreign civil and criminal proceedings, this initial dataset included
both. Appendix A describes the process I used to build the dataset. Briefly, I relied on the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) system—a mandatory electronic docketing system that provides access to all actions filed in federal district
courts nationwide.109 I devised a text search for identifying § 1782
requests that maximized sensitivity without significant sacrifices
in specificity. I then ran the search on Bloomberg Law, which renders PACER text searchable. I manually eliminated false positives and performed several checks to ensure that the dataset is

109 Other scholars have noted the sampling bias stemming from empirical efforts that
rely on Westlaw or Lexis searches. These problems are particularly worrisome for studying
low-profile, routine matters such as § 1782 discovery orders, which tend to be unpublished.
See, for example, David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of
Civil Procedure, 65 Stan L Rev 1203, 1214–15 (2013) (discussing incompleteness in
Westlaw’s and Lexis’s databases); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R. Lidicker,
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 Wash U L Rev 681, 686 (2007) (same).
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close to exhaustive and lacking in bias. I selected the time period
2005 to 2017 to capture recent trends in foreign discovery requests: 2005 is the first full calendar year after the Supreme
Court decided Intel, and 2017 is the final full calendar year prior
to commencement of this study. The dataset is summarized year
by year in Table 5 of Appendix C. I drew a random sample of over
one thousand discovery requests for more detailed analysis, also
summarized year by year in Table 5.
Analysis of the sample shows that approximately one-third
(919) of all requests were connected to criminal proceedings
abroad (“criminal requests”), while approximately two-thirds
(2,070) were connected to civil proceedings abroad (“civil requests”). Breaking down the requests by year shows that the
number of civil requests has grown rapidly, approximately quadrupling between 2005 (49 requests) and 2017 (208 requests).
While it is not possible to determine from docket analysis the
causes of this rapid rise, there are several possible reasons for it:
(1) an increase in cross-border activity leading to more disputes
abroad for which evidence may be gathered in the United
States;110 (2) an increase in foreign substantive laws with extraterritorial reach such that more transnational activity is subject
to civil suits abroad;111 and (3) an increase in awareness and use
of § 1782 by law firms, attorneys, and parties.
There is an inverse trend for criminal requests brought under
§ 1782,112 though this does not necessarily reflect an overall contraction in criminal requests due to the enactment of an overlapping federal statute in 2009.113 There is also a small number of
cases every year—cumulatively more than one hundred over the
study period—that are refiled under another case number due to
110 While different indices for globalization differ on this point, the KOF Globalisation
Index, which measures globalization along economic, social, and political dimensions,
shows a moderate increase in globalization for the United States during the years 2005
through 2016 (the latest year for which data is available). See KOF Swiss Economic Institute, KOF Globalisation Index, archived at https://perma.cc/6RQL-95VP.
111 Thanks to Zach Clopton for this insight.
112 See Appendix C, Table 6.
113 As noted in Part I, § 1782 was amended in 1996 to encompass discovery requests
related to criminal investigations. In 2009, Congress enacted 18 USC § 3512, which authorizes federal judges to “issue such orders as may be necessary to execute a request from
a foreign authority for assistance” with criminal matters. Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-79, 123 Stat 2087 (2009), codified at 18 USC § 3512.
Correspondence with the Department of Justice confirmed that, since 2009, the agency
has gradually reduced reliance on § 1782 for executing criminal requests and no longer
relies on the statute for that purpose. Correspondence with a member of the Department
of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (Feb 20, 2019) (on file with author).
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confusion concerning the proper case type designation for foreign
discovery requests.114 The rising number of civil requests, along
with upper and lower bounds representing 95 percent confidence
intervals, are visualized below in Figure 1 and summarized numerically in Table 6 of Appendix C.
FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS, 2005–2017115

Approximately half of civil requests are sent to the Southern
District of New York, the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida, and the Northern and Central Districts of California,116 with
the rest distributed across the country. Over 60 percent of district
courts nationwide received at least one foreign civil discovery

114

See Part III.C.1 (discussing the significance of these refiled cases).
Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals.
116 See Appendix C, Table 7. Concentration of civil requests in these federal district
courts is not surprising given that American, European, and Asian financial institutions
have historically been subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, Latin American financial institutions have traditionally been subject to jurisdiction in Florida, and many technology companies are subject to jurisdiction in California. Thanks to Kevin Benish for this
observation.
115
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request during the study period.117 The remaining analyses below
rely on in-depth coding of civil requests from the randomly drawn
sample. Appendix B describes the methodology I used for coding.
B.

Request Analysis

I examined basic characteristics of civil requests: who requested them, who they targeted, the nature of the foreign tribunal, the nature of the foreign proceeding for which they were requested, and the country of origin.
1. Requestor.
The vast majority of foreign discovery requests come either
indirectly from foreign tribunals through OIJA (approximately
40 percent) or directly from foreign parties under § 1782 (approximately 55 percent). For the most part, foreign tribunals continue
to seek judicial assistance indirectly through the Hague Evidence
Convention and letters rogatory despite having direct access to
federal courts.118 Additionally, a tiny number of requests originate
from a broader class of “interested persons” (approximately
0.77 percent) who are not a party to, but have some procedural
rights in, a foreign proceeding.119 These findings are summarized
in Table 8 of Appendix C. Figure 2 below visualizes the increase
in tribunal and party requests over time, and shows that the number of party requests has exceeded the number of tribunal requests in most recent years.

117 Fifty-eight of the ninety-four district courts in the federal system received at least
one civil request, while thirty-six district courts did not receive any.
118 In a tiny number of actions, requests originating from tribunals are filed directly
with a district court (approximately 1.1 percent) or are conveyed to the district court by a
foreign party (approximately 2.8 percent).
119 The Supreme Court interpreted “interested person[s]” from the statutory language
of § 1782 to “reach[ ] beyond the universe of persons designated ‘litigant.’” Intel, 542 US
at 256.
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FIGURE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS FROM
FOREIGN TRIBUNALS AND FOREIGN PARTIES, 2005–2017120

2. Target.
The vast majority of civil requests seek discovery from nonparties to the proceeding abroad. This is true for requests from
foreign tribunals (approximately 85 percent) and foreign parties
(approximately 88 percent), and remains consistent over the
study period. Nonparty targets include banks, Internet and social
media companies, as well as law firms. The prominence of nonparties as targets is in part because nonparties located in the
United States cannot be reached by the foreign court where the
case is pending, and in part because discovery targeting nonparties is favored under Intel, so it is advantageous to target a US
nonparty even if a foreign party holds the same information.121

120 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals.
121 See Part III for discussion.
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Table 9 of Appendix C provides a breakdown of requests from foreign tribunals and foreign parties by target.
3. Nature of foreign tribunal and proceeding.
Overall, requests from foreign tribunals are more homogeneous than those from foreign parties. Virtually all requests from
foreign tribunals seek discovery for use in one pending litigation
before a foreign court. Requests from foreign parties are more varied. The vast majority are for use before foreign courts (approximately 90 percent), but a steady number are for use in commercial arbitrations (approximately 9.9 percent) and a smaller
number are for use before foreign regulatory agencies (approximately 4 percent) and investor state arbitrations (approximately
2.5 percent).122 Most party requests are for use in one foreign proceeding (approximately 72 percent) or in only pending foreign
proceedings (approximately 84 percent). But nearly a third are for
simultaneous use in multiple proceedings worldwide (approximately 28 percent) and a steady number are for use in contemplated foreign proceedings that are yet to be filed (approximately
15.9 percent). Tables 10 and 11 of Appendix C summarize these
findings. The number of foreign party requests seeking discovery
for contemplated prefiling proceedings—as well as those for multiple parallel proceedings worldwide—are increasing over time.123
There is significant breadth in the substantive merits issues
in dispute in the foreign civil proceedings. Requests from foreign
tribunals are concentrated primarily in family law (approximately 52 percent), followed by contract (approximately 15 percent) and employment law (approximately 12 percent). These
substantive areas have remained consistently prevalent for tribunal requests over the study period.124 Requests from foreign parties are concentrated primarily in contract law (approximately
27 percent), followed by intellectual property and trade secret law
(approximately 19 percent), and corporate law (approximately
12 percent). While the prevalence of contract law disputes in foreign party requests has remained consistent over the study period, the number of intellectual property and corporate law disputes has grown over time and the number of family law disputes
122 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple forums were counted toward
each category, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. I double
counted because each forum is independently significant.
123 Year-by-year data are on file with author.
124 See Appendix B for a full list of the substantive area categories.
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has diminished.125 These shifting tides suggest that the private
usage of § 1782 is increasingly driven by corporations and increasingly involves the types of cases that are likely to result in
voluminous discovery requests.126 Table 12 of Appendix C summarizes these findings.
4. Country of foreign proceeding.
As the number of civil requests has increased over the years,
so too has the diversity of countries from which they originate.127
This is true both for all requests taken together and for tribunal
and party requests taken separately.
Breaking down the countries by region, legal system type,
and Hague Evidence Convention status128 further illustrates the
range of countries with which district courts are interacting. The
majority of tribunal requests come from the Americas (approximately 62 percent), and the most significant region of growth during the study period is Eastern Europe. The majority of party requests come from Western Europe (approximately 61 percent),
and the most significant region of growth for party requests is
Asia.129 Tribunal requests predominantly seek discovery for use
in civil law countries (approximately 93 percent) and in countries
for which the Hague Evidence Convention is in force with respect
to the United States (approximately 86 percent). Party requests
are again more varied. About as many come from common law
countries (approximately 44 percent) as civil law countries (approximately 46 percent), and a steady number comes from mixed
or other legal systems (approximately 17 percent).130 Most party
requests come from countries for which the Hague Evidence Convention is in force with respect to the United States (approximately 62 percent), but a significant number also come from other

125

Year-by-year data are on file with author.
Born and Rutledge, International Civil Litigation at 967–68 (cited in note 49) (noting that substantive claims involving antitrust, patent, product liability, and other similar
cases often result in “sweeping” discovery requests compared to routine contract or tort
disputes).
127 See Appendix C, Figure 4 showing and explaining a graph visualizing a rise in
Shannon’s entropy, calculated on the mixture of countries over the study period.
128 See Appendix B for a full list of each of these categories.
129 Year-by-year data are on file with author.
130 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple countries with different legal
system types were counted toward each category, which is why the percentages add up to
more than 100 percent. I double counted because each legal system type is independently
significant.
126
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countries (approximately 43 percent).131 See Tables 1 and 2 below
summarizing these findings.
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY REGION OF
ORIGIN, 2005–2017132
Requests from Foreign Tribunals

Americas

Requests from Foreign Parties

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

565

62%

273

23%

483–660

53%–73%

219–343

18%–29%

0

0%

60.7

5.1%

0–11

0%–1.2%

40–96

3.3%–8%

Western

166

18%

732

61%
53%–70%

Caribbean

Europe

126–222

14%–24%

639–837

Eastern

112

12%

53.9

4.5%

Europe

81–158

8.9%–17%

35–87

2.9%–7.2%

Middle East
Asia
Africa

38.3

4.2%

74.2

6.2%

23–67

2.5%–7.4%

51–112

4.2%–9.3%

25.5

2.8%

209

17%

14–50

1.5%–5.5%

163–271

14%–23%

3.2

0.35%

20.2

1.7%

1–17

0.11%–1.9%

11–43

0.92%–3.6%

131 Requests that sought discovery for use in multiple countries with different Hague
Evidence Convention statuses were counted toward each category, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. I double counted because each Convention status is independently significant.
132 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries in multiple regions, it was
counted toward each region, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals.
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This
method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals.
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY LEGAL
SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE133
Requests from Foreign Tribunals
Percentage

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

Legal System Type
Common Law
Civil Law
Mixed/Other

Requests from Foreign Parties

Number

(2005–2017) 134

28.7

3.2%

525

44%

17–54

1.9%–5.9%

445–620

37%–52%

846

93%

553

46%

759–940

83%–98%

470–650

39%–54%

35.1

3.9%

210

17%

21–63

2.3%–6.9%

163–273

14%–23%

Hague Evidence Convention Status (2005–2017) 135
In Force
Not in Force

779

86%

745

62%

690–878

76%–97%

652–851

54%–71%

131

14%

519

43%

97–181

11%–20%

441–613

37%–51%

Breaking down the countries by rule-of-law rating,136 which
was examined for the three-year period 2015–2017 due to limitations in the rule-of-law data used,137 more party requests are for
use in countries with relatively high rule-of-law scores than are
tribunal requests. Approximately half (57 percent) of party
133 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries that fell into multiple categories of any attribute, it was counted toward each category, which is why the percentages
sometimes add up to more than 100 percent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall population. I then
used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how many requests of this
particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative approach and used the lower
bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of
requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals.
134 For a list of countries with each legal system type, see Appendix B.
135 For a list of countries with each Hague Evidence Convention status, see id.
136 As noted in Appendix B, I employed the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.
Like other rule-of-law indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom
House’s Freedom in the World Index, and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has been criticized for conceptual
and methodological problems. Without overlooking or discounting these problems, I use
the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index as an imperfect way to generate a rough
picture of the types of legal systems with which federal district courts are interacting in
foreign discovery requests, and whether that picture is different for foreign tribunal versus
foreign party requests.
137 See Appendix B (discussing rule-of-law score categories and data).

2020]

Exporting American Discovery

2119

requests came from countries with rule-of-law scores in the top
quartile compared to a third (33 percent) of tribunal requests. At
the other end of the spectrum, approximately one-tenth (9.4 percent) of party requests came from countries with rule-of-law
scores in the bottom quartile compared to approximately a quarter (24 percent) of tribunal requests. Note that a far greater proportion of party than tribunal requests (approximately 22 percent
versus 0.95 percent) came from countries for which no rule-of-law
rating is available, suggesting that more party requests are coming from countries that have not traditionally received as much
attention in the US legal community. Table 3 below summarizes
these findings.
These findings suggest that US courts are now interacting
with a larger spectrum of legal systems worldwide, as opposed to
the relatively narrow focus on the civil law systems within Western Europe and South America when the Hague Evidence Convention was negotiated during the 1960s.138 Since most legal
scholarship on comparative law concentrates on these regions, it
is unclear how conclusions from that literature extend to the rest
of the world. There is a growing need to understand a more diverse set of legal systems worldwide, and the types of discovery
to which they may be open.

138 See Burbank, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 132 (cited in note 43) (explaining that the Convention was “[i]ntended . . . to bridge gaps between the civil law and common law systems”).
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY RULE-OFLAW SCORE139
Requests from Foreign Tribunals

Quartile 4
Quartile 3
Quartile 2
Quartile 1

Requests from Foreign Parties

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

101

33%

224

57%

73–142

24%–47%

180–279

46%–71%

95.3

31%

59.2

15%

68–136

22%–45%

39–92

9.9%–23%

31.8

10%

28

7.1%

19–57

6.3%–19%

16–53

4%–13%

72.2

24%

37.4

9.4%

50–108

16%–36%

23–65

5.8%–16%

No Rule-of-

2.9

0.95%

87.2

22%

Law Score

1–15

0.33%–4.9%

61–126

15%–32%

C.

Outcome Analysis

Finally, I examined the outcome of requests. I used two crude
proxies to gauge the complexity of requests: the number of docket
entries and the number of orders.140 I also tracked whether the
request was ultimately granted.141
Foreign party requests are more complex and require more
judicial activity to resolve than those from foreign tribunals. But
both sets of requests are resolved relatively quickly and with minimal judicial activity. Requests from foreign tribunals are typically resolved with one order—the order granting or denying the
request—and such requests were granted approximately
98.1 percent of the time.142 Requests from foreign parties typically
139 Where a request sought discovery for use in countries that fell into multiple categories of any attribute, it was counted toward each category, which is why the percentages
sometimes add up to more than 100 percent. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall population. I then
used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how many requests of this
particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative approach and used the lower
bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of
requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of wider confidence intervals.
140 See Appendix B.
141 See id.
142 This grant rate is calculated by taking the number of cases over the sum of the
number of cases granted and the number of cases denied. Cases that did not reach resolution are not included in the denominator. See Appendix C, Tables 14 and 15.
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take about three orders to resolve, and were granted approximately 86.6 percent of the time.143 The overall grant rate for all
requests over the study period was approximately 91.9 percent.144
Excluded from these grant rate calculations are requests that did
not reach resolution, often because the foreign proceeding had
settled or otherwise reached a conclusion before the US discovery
request reached completion, which in turn led the applicant to
withdraw the request. Requests with no resolution outnumber denials in both tribunal and party requests, suggesting that the lack
of timing coordination between the US discovery request and the
foreign plenary proceeding limits the potential use of US discovery abroad.145 Figure 3 below visualizes the estimated grant rate
for all requests, tribunal requests, and party requests over the
study period. Tables 13, 14, and 15 in Appendix C summarize the
numerical outcome data.
While it would be illuminating, it is not possible to compare
these grant rates to those of domestic discovery requests. This is
first and foremost because domestic discovery is typically negotiated between the parties at the outset and does not generate a
record in the docket unless there is a disagreement and a motion
to the court to resolve it. Additionally, I have not found any empirical research quantifying the rate at which motions to compel
or motions for protective orders are granted domestically.

143
144
145

See id.
See Appendix C, Table 15.
See Appendix C, Table 14.
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATED GRANT RATES OF CIVIL REQUESTS

For 2015 only, I tracked the outcome and contestation status—meaning whether the request was challenged146—for every
request. Table 4 below summarizes the findings. Tribunal requests were granted 98.9 percent of the time and contested only
3.3 percent of the time. Party requests were granted 90 percent of
the time and contested 37 percent of the time. The grant rate was
higher for uncontested party requests (93.9 percent) than contested party requests (82.4 percent). The overall grant rate for
both sets of requests was 94 percent and the overall contestation
rate was 22 percent.

146 A request may be challenged at the outset if notice was provided. More likely, a
request was initially granted ex parte and then subsequently challenged in the form of a
motion to quash, motion to vacate, motion to stay, motion for reconsideration, or a motion
to compel from the requestor that is opposed. A request may be challenged by the target
of discovery, whether party or nonparty to the foreign proceeding, or it may be challenged
by the nontarget opposing party. I did not count entries of stipulated protective orders or
other requests for confidentiality agreements as contestation. See Appendix B.
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TABLE 4: GRANT AND CONTESTATION RATES FOR 2015147

Overall Grant
Rate148
Contestation
Rate149
Grant Rate for
Contested
Grant Rate for
Uncontested

Requests from

Requests from

Foreign Tribunals

Foreign Parties

98.9%

90%

94%

3.3%

37%

22%

67% 150

82.4%

81.1%

100%

93.9%

97.3%

All Requests

Logistic regression consistently indicated a strong negative
correlation between a request being contested and its likelihood
of being granted.151 This correlation was strongly indicated even
in the presence of other variables significantly correlated with

147

These figures are not estimates, as they are based on all requests in 2015.
The grant rate is calculated by taking the number of granted requests over the
sum of the number of granted requests and denied requests. Requests that did not reach
resolution are not included in the denominator.
149 The contestation rate is calculated by taking the number of challenged requests
over the sum of the number of challenged requests and unchallenged requests (including
requests involving a stipulated protective order or other confidentiality agreement).
150 There were only three contested tribunal requests and one was denied.
151 To identify the best logistic regression model, I followed a standard best-subset
approach: for each model size, I fitted a model with every possible combination of variables
and chose the model with the lowest residual deviance. To select the appropriate model
size and to avoid overfitting, I then performed cross-validation and considered two metrics
that penalize large models, AIC and BIC. BIC and cross-validation both pointed toward a
one-variable model containing only contestation, whereas AIC pointed toward a threevariable model containing contestation, target identity, and numerosity of foreign proceedings for which discovery was requested. I additionally performed Firth logistic regression, a penalized form of regression designed to address the problems associated with separated or nearly separated data. See Georg Heinze, A Comparative Investigation of
Methods for Logistic Regression with Separated or Nearly Separated Data, 25 Statist Med
4216, 4224–25 (2006). The Firth regression suggested a three-variable model containing
contestation, target identity, and the legal system type of the country from which the request originated.
148
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contestation.152 With respect to the remaining variables, logistic
regression yielded inconsistent results.153
D. Unknowns
While docket analysis can shed light on the nature of foreign
discovery requests and their outcomes in federal district courts,
there are several critical pieces of information that docket analysis cannot reveal. First, it cannot show whether the foreign opposing party was notified about discovery requests coming from
foreign parties. Requests are typically considered ex parte at the
outset.154 If an ex parte request is granted, as most are, a subpoena and order are served on the discovery target, which is when
the target learns of the discovery request. If the target is, or is
related to, the foreign opposing party (itself difficult to ascertain
in a systematic manner), then the latter learns of the request at
the same time. If the target is not related to the foreign opposing
party, notification cannot be systematically tracked because, as
discussed in Part III, it is provided haphazardly and sometimes
in the absence of a written record.155 Without knowing when notification was provided, I was unable to examine the extent to
which the low contestation rate was due to lack of notice versus
failure to contest. If the lack of notice is depressing the contestation rate, then it may also be raising the grant rate.
Second, for similar reasons, and also discussed in Part III, it
was not possible to systematically track whether the foreign tribunal received notification of the request. Without this information, I was unable to differentiate lack of awareness that the
discovery request had been made from lack of resistance to US
discovery. Consequently, it was not possible to look for any

152 In the one-variable model containing contestation, the absence of contestation was
associated with a 2.17 increase in the log-odds of a request being granted, significant at
the level of p = 0.001. In the Firth three-variable model, contestation was associated with
a 1.72 increase in the log-odds of a request being granted, significant at the level of
p = 0.015.
153 Given the problematic nature of the 2015 data set, however, this should not be
taken as evidence against an association between these variables and the likelihood of a
request being granted. The 2015 data set had a strikingly high grant rate (over 94 percent), perfect separation along one variable, and near perfect separation along another.
Several covariates strongly correlated with each other as well.
154 See Part III.C.1.
155 For example, notice might be given informally as a matter of courtesy or incidentally through communication between the target and the foreign opposing party. Id.
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overarching patterns in the types of foreign tribunals that are
more receptive or opposed to US discovery.
Third, docket analysis provides incomplete information about
when multiple discovery requests are made in the United States
for the same foreign proceeding. Unlike domestic discovery requests that are a part of a larger plenary dispute and overseen by
the same judge, each foreign discovery request is its own standalone action. Consequently, a single proceeding abroad can generate many discovery requests in different US district courts,
each before a different judge. Sometimes, these requests are consolidated and other times they are not.
Finally, docket analysis does not provide systematic information about what happens after discovery is compelled—including whether the requested discovery was ultimately produced and
submitted to the foreign tribunal, whether the foreign tribunal
took it under consideration, and whether it affected the outcome
of the foreign proceeding. In Intel, the Supreme Court asserted
that district and foreign courts could, respectively, condition
grants and acceptances of discovery on reciprocal exchanges of information between the foreign parties to maintain an appropriate
measure of parity.156 District courts very rarely impose such a condition,157 and it is not possible to know from docket analysis if such
a condition is imposed downstream by the foreign tribunal. In
short, the impact of discovery compelled in the United States on
foreign proceedings and foreign parties is largely unknown—to
scholars relying on docket analysis as well as to US judges deciding foreign discovery requests, and, in most cases, granting
them.158
III. EVALUATING AMERICAN DISCOVERY IN THE WORLD
Having characterized the rise in foreign demand for US discovery, the differences between demand from foreign tribunals
and foreign parties, the high rates at which both types of requests
are granted, and the key unknowns, this Part now evaluates doctrinally whether US judges are serving as effective discovery
gatekeepers for foreign proceedings. All foreign discovery
156

See Intel, 542 US at 262.
Although I did not systematically track whether granted discovery requests were
conditioned on a reciprocal flow of information, reciprocity is extremely rare. A few examples are discussed below in Part III.C.3.
158 To find this information, one would have to interview those to whom compelled US
discovery was granted and track down each foreign proceeding abroad.
157
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requests for use in civil disputes abroad are executed under
§ 1782, regardless of whether they began as a letters rogatory, a
request under the Hague Evidence Convention, or a § 1782 application brought directly by a foreign party.159 Section 1782, in turn,
has been described as a “screen” or “threshold determination” of
whether to allow a foreign actor access to US discovery as it operates domestically.160 Once that threshold is overcome, § 1782
“drops out” and the “ordinary tools of discovery management” under the FRCP take over.161 It is assumed that the FRCP can be
seamlessly translated from the domestic to the transnational context, and that district courts can weigh the interests of affected
parties in foreign countries just as they do in the United States.
Drawing from the empirical findings above as well as district
court proceedings and appellate court decisions, I argue that the
machinery developed for domestic discovery is both improperly
applied to—and ill-equipped to manage the challenges of—exported discovery. The blueprint for domestic discovery falls short
in distinctive ways when applied to requests from foreign tribunals. In entertaining requests from foreign tribunals, federal
courts have a greatly reduced justification for exercising the discretion they typically wield under the FRCP or under Intel’s discretionary factors. That is because tribunal requests are not adversarial, and there is no uncertainty surrounding whether the
foreign tribunal is receptive to US discovery, given that the tribunal is making the request.
By contrast, requests from foreign parties are—and should
be—adversarial between the two contending parties in the foreign dispute. But much of the time they are not, or they involve
some but not all of the relevant stakeholders, resulting in a distorted adversarialism and missing information. I identify who the
relevant stakeholders are and the information that each uniquely
possesses, in the absence of which district courts are unable to
undertake the analysis required under the FRCP or under Intel’s
discretionary factors. Because judges are at a severe informational disadvantage when fielding requests from foreign parties,

159

See Part I.B.
See, for example, Texas Keystone, Inc v Prime Natural Resources, Inc, 694 F3d 548,
554 (5th Cir 2012); Government of Ghana v ProEnergy Services, LLC, 677 F3d 340, 343
(8th Cir 2012); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v Biomet, Inc, 633 F3d 591, 597 (7th Cir 2011).
161 Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 597. See also 28 USC § 1782 (“To the extent that the
order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
160
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they have developed more manageable heuristics that place a
heavy thumb on the scale for granting applications, which in turn
threatens to undermine foreign litigation as well as universal and
American litigation values.
Part III.A examines the underlying tenets of domestic discovery. Parts III.B and III.C look, respectively, at how foreign tribunal
requests and foreign party requests deviate from this framework.
A.

A Domestic Procedure for Foreign Use

At the core of American civil litigation is a litigant-driven system for obtaining information from adverse parties that aims to
give both sides “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial.”162 That system is considered fundamental to
fair adjudication because it narrows the issues, promotes settlement, and reduces surprises during trial.163 It relies on contending
adversaries to negotiate a mutual exchange of information that
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case, and a
judge to manage and resolve discovery disagreements. Although
this vision of active judicial management of discovery has not
been fully realized in the domestic context,164 setting out this ideal
highlights the grave problems posed by discovery in the international context.
The FRCP give litigants broad authority to obtain from each
other “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”165 This scope is subject to
the requirement that discovery be “proportional to the needs of
the case,” which requires a consideration of “the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery

162

Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 501 (1947).
See United States v Procter & Gamble Co, 356 US 677, 682 (1958) (“Modern instruments of discovery . . . make a trial less a game of blindman’s buff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”); Hickman, 329 US at 507 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation.”); John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need
for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L J 547, 556–63 (2010).
164 See Paul W. Grimm and David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 SC L Rev 495,
505–07 (2013) (noting “a lack of active judicial management” despite general agreement
that active judicial involvement in discovery “leads to better . . . results”).
165 FRCP 26(b)(1).
163
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outweighs its likely benefit.”166 The adversaries direct discovery
requests to each other and negotiate the level of compliance.167 If
they are unable to reach an agreement, a litigant can ask the court
to compel discovery or for a protective order to forestall discovery.168
The current regime is the result of changes made over the
past few decades in response to criticisms that discovery has been
used abusively.169 The ongoing debate on the need for discovery
reform in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article,170
except to note the measures courts have adopted to address discovery abuse. Most notably, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted
the FRCP’s pleading standard, raising the bar for surviving a motion to dismiss as an indirect way to narrow discovery.171 The
FRCP have also been revised to encourage “more aggressive judicial control and supervision,”172 both at the outset through pretrial
scheduling conferences, and later on through the proportionality
requirement. The adversaries and the court “have a collective responsibility to consider [ ] proportionality.”173 Participation from
all parties is needed to elucidate the proportionality factors since
each party holds different information, and that information may
166

Id.
See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 Vand L Rev 1295, 1304 (1978):
167

Modern discovery [ ] has removed most of the decisive plays from the scrutiny of
the court. Because so many civil cases are settled before trial and because the
conduct of attorneys is subject only to fitful and superficial judicial review during
the discovery stage, much of the decisive gamesmanship of modern litigation
takes place in private settings.
168 See FRCP 26(c)(1) (providing that a party “from whom discovery is sought” can
move for a protective order following an effort to resolve the dispute without court action;
protective order can be issued to protect from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense”); FRCP 37 (providing that a party may move for an order to
compel discovery following an effort to obtain the discovery without court action).
169 See FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1980 Amendment, Note
to Subdivision (f) (“There has been widespread criticism of abuse of discovery.”); FRCP 26,
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment (“Excessive discovery and
evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems.”). See
also Herbert v Lando, 441 US 153, 179 (1979) (Powell concurring) (expressing concern that
federal discovery rules are “not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice”).
170 See, for example, Matthew T. Ciulla, Note, A Disproportionate Response? The 2015
Proportionality Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), 92 Notre Dame L
Rev 1395, 1405–09 (2017) (noting wide differences in opinion concerning the need for discovery reform).
171 See Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 558–60 (2007) (discussing the cost
of discovery); Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 684–86 (2009) (same).
172 FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment, Note to
Subdivision (g).
173 FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2015 Amendment.
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change or clarify over time.174 When parties disagree, the court’s
role is to consider all the factors given the information provided
by the parties, and to arrive at a case-specific determination,
which is in turn reviewed for abuse of discretion.175 Some scholars
have questioned whether judges can effectively apply the proportionality requirement, given the vagueness of the standard and
judges’ relative lack of in-depth knowledge about the facts of the
case.176 Some of the proportionality factors are difficult to quantify
or require forecasting the value of sought-after information to the
underlying dispute.177
The FRCP also allow parties to seek compelled discovery from
nonparties178—a process that maintains the core adversarial relationship between the parties by involving all parties to the dispute as well as the court presiding over the action. Notice and a
copy of the subpoena must be served on each party to the dispute
before it can be served on the nonparty target,179 so that other
parties have an opportunity to object, to monitor the discovery,
and to seek access to the information produced or make additional
discovery requests of their own.180 When the nonparty is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the district where the case is pending,
two district courts may be involved. The district court where the
case is pending issues the subpoena,181 and the district court where
the nonparty is found manages compliance and hears subpoenarelated motions182—a measure designed to protect nonparties
through local resolution of disagreements. The judge in the
174 See id (noting that the factors may not be fully understood at the outset and that
the requesting party may not know about the burden or expense, while the requested party
may not know about the importance of the sought-after discovery for resolving the underlying issues).
175 See, for example, Moore v Ford Motor Co, 755 F3d 802, 808 (5th Cir 2014) (explaining that a judge’s discovery decision is reversible only if it is “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable” and results in “prejudice”).
176 See, for example, Ciulla, Note, 92 Notre Dame L Rev at 1402 (cited in note 170)
(noting that the impact of amendments has not been as great as expected); Scott A. Moss,
Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving
Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 Duke L J 889, 889–90 (2009) (noting that the “proportionality rules are impossible to apply effectively”).
177 See Jonah B. Gelbach and Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 Ga L Rev 1093, 1114–16 (2016).
178 See FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) (stipulating that a subpoena may compel a person to “attend and testify; produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control”).
179 See FRCP 30(b)(1), 45(a)(4).
180 See FRCP 45(a)(4), (b) (setting out service requirements).
181 See FRCP 45(a)(2).
182 See FRCP 45(a)(1)–(2).
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compliance court is encouraged to consult with the judge in the
issuing court on subpoena-related motions, since the latter is
more familiar with the underlying case.183 Motions can also be
transferred back to the issuing court so as not to disrupt the issuing court’s supervision over the underlying litigation, as might
occur if the same discovery questions are likely to arise in many
district courts or if the issuing court has already ruled on questions implicated by the motion.184 The FRCP recognize that the
participation of the judge presiding over the case may be necessary due to her knowledge of the case and in order to consistently
manage discovery requests across the case.
B.

Use by Foreign Tribunals

When a district court receives a discovery request from a foreign tribunal, its role bears little resemblance to discovery within
the United States. Under long-standing custom, these requests
are typically considered on an ex parte basis.185 This practice is
characterized by Professor Jim Pfander and Daniel Birk as an exercise of “non-contentious” Article III jurisdiction, which gives
federal courts power to consider nonadversarial applications asserting a legal interest under federal law.186 While the target of a
foreign tribunal request may oppose the discovery sought, leading
to litigation that creates “a measure of adverseness,”187 tribunal
requests are not adverse between the two contending parties in
the underlying plenary dispute. For this reason, discovery requests from foreign tribunals have been likened to administrative

183 See FRCP 45, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2013 Amendment, Note
to Subdivision (f).
184 See id.
185 See In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F2d 1216, 1219
(9th Cir 1976) (“Letters Rogatory are customarily received and appropriate action taken
with respect thereto ex parte.”).
186 James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L J 1346, 1355, 1390–91 (2015).
187 Id at 1391.
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subpoenas that federal courts enforce on behalf of agencies188—a
limited judicial role that has been described as “adjunct.”189
Without adversity between the two contending parties to the
foreign dispute, district courts cannot exercise their usual broad
discretion in evaluating domestic discovery disputes. There are
no party needs or interests to weigh, and no disagreements over
particular discovery requests to resolve. As noted in Part II, approximately 93 percent of foreign tribunal requests come from civil
law countries,190 where discovery is primarily a judicial function.191
Nor is a district court entertaining a foreign tribunal request
playing its usual screening role under § 1782. The statute requires that the requested discovery be “for use in a proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal.”192 Three out of the four discretionary factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Intel—
whether the discovery is available to the foreign tribunal without
US court assistance, whether the foreign tribunal will be receptive to US court assistance, and whether the discovery request is
an attempt to circumvent foreign discovery restrictions—weigh
the likelihood that granting the request will offend a foreign tribunal.193 When the request is made by the foreign tribunal, it can
be inferred that the discovery is for use in the proceeding it is
adjudicating, and that the three comity-oriented Intel discretionary factors are met. Some courts acknowledge that these analyses
collapse when the request comes from a foreign tribunal, while
others parrot standard conclusory language that the Intel factors
weigh in favor of granting the request.194
188 See In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave NE, Bellevue, Wash, 634 F3d 557, 566
(9th Cir 2011) (likening a discovery request from the Russian government to “an order
enforcing the subpoenas of independent administrative agencies, an order granting a subpoena in aid of an extradition proceeding, and an order to appear before the Internal Revenue Service”).
189 Pfander and Birk, 124 Yale L J at 1379 (cited in note 186). See also United States
v Markwood, 48 F3d 969, 976–77 (6th Cir 1995) (emphasizing that “a “district court’s role
in the enforcement of an administrative subpoena is a limited one” consisting of determining whether the agency has met statutory and judicially created standards for issuing and
enforcing the subpoena).
190 See Table 2.
191 See, for example, John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U Chi L Rev 823, 827 (1985) (noting that in Germany, “[d]igging for facts is primarily
the work of the judge”).
192 28 USC § 1782.
193 See Intel, 542 US at 264–65.
194 Compare In re Clerici, 481 F3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir 2007) (explaining that the
Intel factors for receptivity and noncircumvention supported granting the request “given
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Not only are the bases for a district court’s usual exercise of
jurisdiction under the FRCP and § 1782 inapposite, but for the
approximately 86 percent of tribunal requests coming from countries for which the Hague Evidence Convention is in force with
respect to the United States,195 district courts are further limited
to a handful of permissible reasons for denying requests.196 This
restriction under international law is not altered by the Convention’s internal execution through a preexisting general-use statute that is discretionary.197 For all of these reasons, the very low
contestation rates and very high grant rates observed—typically
with minimal judicial activity, the order granting the request being the only order issued by the court—are, for the most part, justified. These observations suggest that judges are highly deferential to the Hague Evidence Convention and, by extension, foreign
tribunals, granting their requests more or less as a matter of
course.198 Conversely, judges occasionally exceed their discretion
by denying tribunal requests in violation of international law.199

that the foreign tribunal here is the Panamanian Court and the Panamanian Court itself
issued the letter rogatory requesting assistance”), with Order, Request for International
Judicial Assistance from the 12th Family Court in Istanbul, Turkey; Matter of Ekmekçi v
Ekmekçi, No 1:15-mc-22425, *1 (SD Fla filed July 1, 2015) (“The statutory requirements
set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) have been met. Furthermore, the additional factors to be
considered . . . weigh in favor of granting the request.”), citing Intel, 542 US at 247.
195 See Table 2.
196 The permissible grounds for denying a discovery request under the Hague Evidence Convention include if the request does not comply with Convention requirements
(Article 5), if the request is for a matter that is not civil or commercial (Article 1), and if
the country to which the request is addressed “considers that its sovereignty or security
would be prejudiced thereby” (Article 12). Hague Evidence Convention Arts 1, 5, 12(b), 23
UST at 2557, 2560, 2562.
197 See In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave, 634 F3d at 568, 570–72 (holding that
the US-Russia Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty governing discovery assistance in criminal
matters superseded § 1782’s grant of discretionary authority to district courts); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 309(2) (2013) (“When there
is a conflict between a self-executing treaty provision and a federal statute, courts in the
United States will apply whichever reflects the latest expression of the will of the U.S.
political branches.”).
198 There were five tribunal requests that were denied in the random sample. All but
one of the denials were for technical reasons, such as a technical defect in the application,
and without prejudice. The last denial is discussed below in note 199.
199 See, for example, Transcript of Hearing on Petition for Judicial Review, In re Request for International Judicial Assistance from the National Court of First Instance in
Labor Matters No 37 of Buenos Aires, Argentina, No 3:12-cv-00662, *4–8 (D Nev filed Sept
16, 2013), (denying a tribunal request from Argentina in part due to the judge’s belief that
the country from which the request originated did not honor American judgments and
extradition requests—a ground for denial not permitted under the Convention).
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Use by Foreign Parties

When a district court receives a discovery request directly
from a foreign party, it bears some resemblance to discovery
within the United States. The request is coming from a party to a
foreign proceeding against an adverse party, which parallels the
bipolar structure of domestic discovery disputes. Perhaps because
of this analogous structure, some courts are confident that their
“substantial experience controlling discovery abuse in domestic
litigation” prepares them for “similarly root[ing] out sham applications under § 1782.”200 It is assumed that district courts are best
positioned to weigh the needs and interests of parties affected by
a foreign discovery request, just as they are in domestic discovery
requests,201 and that the FRCP’s safeguards are well-suited to
prevent foreign misuse.202 Consequently, the same abuse of discretion standard of review for ordinary discovery rulings is applied to § 1782 rulings.203
Yet, foreign discovery requests are distinctive in two key respects. First, there are two courts involved in a foreign discovery
request—the US court entertaining the discovery request, and
the foreign court presiding over the action. Since the plenary suit
is necessarily abroad, it is governed by a different set of procedural rules. When a discovery request comes from a foreign party,
it cannot be guaranteed that the foreign court or tribunal will accept US discovery under the FRCP as would another district court
governed by the FRCP. Precisely for this reason, Intel set out
three discretionary factors aimed at discerning whether the foreign court is receptive to exported discovery. Second, unlike domestic out-of-district discovery requests targeting a nonparty and
involving two district courts, there is no clear requirement for informing or involving other parties to the foreign dispute or for
consulting with the foreign court on subpoena-related motions. A
foreign discovery request “stands separate from the main controversy” in a heightened way.204 There is both a heightened need for
information given procedural differences between countries, and

200

Glock v Glock, Inc, 797 F3d 1002, 1009 (11th Cir 2015).
In re Schlich, 893 F3d 40, 46 (1st Cir 2018), quoting Seattle Times Co v Rhinehart,
467 US 20, 36 (1984).
202 A Bill to Revise, Codify, and Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code, Entitled “Judicial Code and the Judiciary”, HR Rep No 79-2646, 79 Cong, 2d Sess A146 (1946).
203 Kang v Noro-Moseley Partners, 246 F Appx 662, 663 (11th Cir 2007). See also ProEnergy Services, LLC, 677 F3d at 344; Nascimento v Faria, 600 F Appx 811, 812 (2d Cir 2015).
204 In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave, 634 F3d at 566 (quotation marks omitted).
201
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a reduced supply of information due to the absence of procedures
for consulting the foreign opposing party and the foreign court.
Consequently, requests from foreign parties cause more complications than those from foreign tribunals.
1. Missing stakeholders and information.
There is an acute lack of clarity as to who should be informed,
involved, or consulted when a district court receives a discovery
request from a foreign party. Following precedents concerning
discovery requests from foreign tribunals, many courts have held
that it is proper for § 1782 applications to be made on an ex parte
basis even when that application comes from a foreign party.205
The rationale is usually that no prejudice will result because the
target of the discovery will eventually have an opportunity to contest it once served with the subpoena.206 This reasoning does not
distinguish between a discovery request that targets a party and
one that targets a nonparty. It is the latter scenario that leaves
the foreign adversary in the dark, preventing it from objecting to,
monitoring, or seeking access to the requested discovery, as a domestic adversary would be able to do.207
Other courts have not condoned ex parte proceedings. But
even when notification is required, courts do not agree on the legal basis for, or the components of, the requirement. Some have
applied FRCP 45’s requirement that all parties be notified of

205 See, for example, Gushlak v Gushlak, 486 F Appx 215, 217 (2d Cir 2012) (stating
that “it is neither uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant applications made
pursuant to § 1782 ex parte” and listing several examples); Order, Elkind v CCBill, LLC,
No 2:14-mc-00030, *1 (D Ariz filed May 9, 2014) (granting ex parte request).
206 See, for example, In re Ex Parte Application of Société d’Etude de Réalisation et
d’Exploitation pour le Traitement du Mais, 2013 WL 6164435, *2 n 1 (ED Pa) (explaining
that ex parte applications under § 1782 are justified because the parties will be given adequate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request and will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery); In re Letter of Request from Supreme Court of
Hong Kong, 138 FRD 27, 32 n 6 (SDNY 1991) (“[S]uch ex parte applications are typically
justified by the fact that the parties will be given adequate notice of any discovery taken
pursuant to the request and will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery
or to participate in it.”); Interbrew Central Europe Holding BV v Molson Coors Brewing
Co, 2013 WL 5567504, *1 (D Colo) (finding that “Applicant’s ex parte request is appropriately made and that Respondents may later seek modification of the discovery herein ordered by way of an appropriate motion”).
207 See Part III.A (discussing that FRCP 45 requires notification to all parties of discovery requests targeting nonparties).
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discovery requests targeting nonparties.208 Others have applied
local rules concerning ex parte orders—for instance, the Central
District of California’s rule mandating a memorandum explaining
why a matter was brought ex parte.209 Yet others have required
notice as a matter of judicial discretion since § 1782 does not prescribe ex parte applications,210 or requested briefing on whether
notice is needed.211 Some have even treated foreign discovery requests as if they are full cases or controversies, extending FRCP
Rule 4’s requirement that a plaintiff serve a summons and a copy
of the complaint on the defendant.212 The specific notification requirement has also varied: courts have ordered applicants to notify the target of the discovery request,213 the adverse party in the

208 See In re Hornbeam Corp, 722 F Appx 7, 10–11 (2d Cir 2018) (applying
FRCP 45(a)(4)’s notification requirements but nevertheless affirming the district court’s
denial of a motion to vacate or quash and refusal to sanction the applicant due to lack of
prejudice).
209 See, for example, Order by Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato, In re Ex Parte Application of Nokia Corp, No 8:13-mc-00010, *1 (CD Cal filed May 15, 2013) (denying a
§ 1782 request without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-19 governing ex
parte applications in the Central District of California).
210 See, for example, In re Merck & Co, Inc, 197 FRD 267, 270–71 (MD NC 2000)
(observing that “[n]othing in Section 1782 states that the application is to be made ex
parte, much less that the Court must entertain the application ex parte,” and concluding
that “nothing in Section 1782 prevents the Court in any given case from advancing the
process by requiring the notification to take place at an earlier time in order to reduce
disruption and conserve judicial resources”) (emphasis in original).
211 See, for example, Request to File Under Seal, In re Application of Lúcia de Araujo
Bertolla for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain Discovery for Use in a Foreign
Proceeding, No 1:17-mc-00284, *1 (SDNY filed April 25, 2018) (Araujo Bertolla Request to
File Under Seal) (explaining that the court requested the applicant brief the issue of why
the federal rules’ subpoena notice requirement should not apply).
212 See, for example, Order to Show Cause, In re the Court Order of the Romford
County Court of Great Britian Dated May 21, 2009, No 6-11-mc-00028, *1 (MD Fla filed
May 6, 2011) (ordering the applicant to explain in writing why the target has not been
served per a prior order and threatening sanctions as well as denial of the request). See
also Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles Managed by Affiliates of Fortress
Investment Group LLC v KPMG LLP, No 1:14-cv-01801 (SDNY filed Mar 14, 2014), (issuing a summons for a § 1782 request); Summons in a Civil Case, Blue Traffic Ltd v VT
iDirect, Inc, No 1:08-mc-00031 (ED Va filed July 7, 2008) (same). For the text of this requirement, see FRCP 4(c).
213 See, for example, Order, In re Application of Halliburton SAS, No 1:14-mc-00004,
*2 (ED Va filed Feb 4, 2014) (Halliburton Application Order); In re Ex Parte Application
of Apple, Inc, Apple Retail Germany GmBh; and Apple Sales International, No 3:12-cv00179, *1 (SD Cal filed Feb 1, 2012) (Apple Application Order); Order to Show Cause Why
this Court Should Not Grant Ecuadorean Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Expedited
Service and Enforcement of Subpoenas to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceeding Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Daniel Carlos Lusitand Yaiguaje,
No 3:11-mc-80087, *2 (ND Cal filed May 9, 2011) (Yaiguaje Application Order).
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foreign proceeding against whom the evidence is to be used,214 and
the foreign court itself.215 Sometimes notice is not required but
given as a matter of courtesy, with or without a written record.
The confusion goes deeper: whether a foreign discovery request is a case or controversy is itself a question that has caused
widespread discord across district courts, revealing uncertainty
about the basic structure of these requests as well as the due process and personal jurisdiction requirements attending them.216 As
noted in Part II, more than a hundred cases were recategorized
by district courts either from a miscellaneous case to a civil case
or vice versa during the study period of 2005 to 2017.217 Miscellaneous matters are typically ancillary or ex parte proceedings such
as an out-of-district motion to compel or motion to quash, or the
registration of a judgment from another district court. 218 Civil
matters are typically full cases or controversies between adversarial parties that invoke all the protections of the FRCP, including the requirement for a summons and service when a complaint
is filed. That there is no case or controversy in the United States
attached to foreign discovery requests has befuddled courts.
The result of this confusion and the accompanying erratic notification requirements are missing parties and stakeholders that
ultimately deprive federal courts of the information they need to
214 See, for example, Halliburton Application Order at *2 (cited in note 213) (ordering
that applicant provide notice to a number of relevant parties); Apple Application Order at
*1 (cited in note 213) (same); Yaiguaje Application Order at *2 (cited in note 213) (same).
215 See, for example, Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 of Financial
Guaranty Insurance Co v Lehman Brothers, Inc, No 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (SDNY filed Mar
29, 2011).
216 For background on the “case or controversy” requirement and its constitutional
roots, see Martin H. Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U Chi L
Rev 545, 563–66 (2006).
217 See Appendix C, Table 6. Compare Notice of New Case Number and Notice of
Judge Assignment, In re Application of Hulley Enterprises Ltd, Yukos Universal Ltd, and
Veteran Petroleum Ltd for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for
Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No 2:17-mc-00088, *1 (CD Cal filed Sept 26, 2017) (case converted from miscellaneous to civil); Order Directing the Clerk of Court to Redesignate this
Matter as a Contested Civil Case for Statistical Purposes, In re Application of H.M.B.
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings,
No 1:17-cv-21459 (SD Fla filed May 1, 2018) (same), with Order, APR Energy Holdings
Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, No 1:17-cv-02784, *1 (SDNY filed
Apr 24, 2017) (case converted from civil to miscellaneous); Notice Regarding E-filing, In re
Application of Akebia Therapeutics, Inc for an Order Granting Leave to Issue Subpoena for
the Taking of Discovery Pursuant to 28 USC 1782, No 5:14-cv-04678, *1 (ND Cal filed Oct
21, 2014) (same).
218 See, for example, US District Court Northern District of Texas, Electronic Case Filing: Opening a Miscellaneous Case 1 (Nov 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/Y9VU-KR2X.
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conduct rigorous analyses. Because foreign discovery requests are
frequently decided without the knowledge and input of the foreign
adversary or the foreign court, the range of basic information that
judges struggle to ascertain is staggering. They include: whether
the foreign proceeding is civil or criminal;219 whether the foreign
proceeding is on appeal;220 whether the requested discovery is relevant to the foreign dispute;221 whether the foreign defendant has
been served;222 the whereabouts of the foreign proceeding;223 the
scope of discovery that is available in the country where the proceeding is being adjudicated;224 and whether a similar discovery
request has already been denied in that country.225 The remainder
of this Section examines how these missing stakeholders and this
missing information impacts foreign litigation, basic notions of
due process and fairness, and US litigation values.
2. Undermining foreign tribunals and litigation.
When the Supreme Court considered § 1782 in Intel, the
Court stated that comity is “important as [a] touchstone[ ] for a
district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases.”226 The
Supreme Court laid out four discretionary factors for district
courts to consider, three of which are directed toward ensuring
deference to and avoiding interference with foreign tribunals.227
The first factor is whether the foreign tribunal can itself order
production of the evidence sought, or if it is unobtainable without

219 See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switzerland GmBh, 742 F Appx 690, 697 (3d Cir
2018) (noting that the lower court erred in concluding that discovery was sought for a
criminal appeal when in fact it was sought for a civil trial proceeding).
220 See id.
221 See Order, In re Application of Raoul Malak, No 2:14-mc-00089, *4 (D Ariz filed Feb
17, 2015) (Malak Application Order) (“[T]he Court lacks any meaningful information with
which to determine whether the such [sic] discovery is relevant to the foreign proceeding.”).
222 See Memo Endorsement, In re Application of Gorsoan Ltd and Gazprombank
OJSC for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign
Proceeding, No 1:13-mc-00397, *1 (SDNY filed Oct 22, 2014).
223 See Memorandum and Order Regarding Intervenor’s Motion to Quash and to Vacate, In re: Application of Hanwha Azdel, Inc and Hanwha L&C Corp for Assistance Before
a Foreign Tribunal, No 3:13-mc-93004, *2–4 (D Mass filed Oct 29, 2013).
224 See Marubeni America Corp v LBA Y.K., 335 F Appx 95, 97–98 (2d Cir 2009).
225 See In re Chevron Corp, 633 F3d 153, 162–63 (3d Cir 2011).
226 Intel, 542 US at 261.
227 The fourth discretionary factor and parity, which the Court also identified as “important as [a] touchstone[ ] for a district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases,”
will be discussed in the following section. Id. See also Dodge, 115 Colum L Rev at 2105
(cited in note 52) (noting that § 1782 is motivated by “adjudicative comity,” which the author defines as “deference to foreign courts”).
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US court assistance.228 Because the underlying discovery request
in Intel sought evidence from a party to the foreign proceeding,
the Supreme Court focused on the party status of the discovery
target, writing that “when the person from whom discovery is
sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding . . . , the need for
§ 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when
evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising
abroad.”229 The second factor is whether US discovery assistance
is desired abroad, and the Supreme Court instructed district
courts that they may consider “the nature of the foreign tribunal,
the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to
U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.”230 The third factor, related
to the second, is whether the foreign discovery request “conceals
an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.”231
Due to the lack of input from foreign tribunals and foreign
opposing parties in § 1782 proceedings, and the open-ended nature of these factors,232 district courts have evolved simplified
tests that lead to reflexive grants of foreign discovery requests.
These simplified tests reflect Professor Maggie Gardner’s observation that the complex inquiries required in transnational cases
encourage judges to develop analytical shortcuts that can lead to
systemic bias favoring what is known (US parties and US law)
over what is not known (foreign parties and foreign law).233 In the
§ 1782 context, the simplified tests systematically tip the scale
toward granting foreign discovery requests while failing to
properly apply Intel’s discretionary factors.
The first factor concerning whether the foreign tribunal can
obtain the requested evidence without US assistance is often simplified to ask whether the target of the discovery request is a
party or nonparty to the foreign proceeding. This analysis is easier to manage judicially, leading many courts to recite standard
language that discovery is favored because it is sought from a

228

See Intel, 542 US at 264.
Id.
230 Id.
231 Id at 265.
232 See Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles v KPMG, LLP, 798 F3d
113, 118 (2d Cir 2015) (commenting that the Intel opinion does not provide guidance on
“minimum requirements or tests to be met”).
233 See Gardner, 69 Stan L Rev at 959–64 (cited in note 86).
229
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nonparty.234 In fact, many discovery requests strategically target
a token nonparty although the same evidence is also held by a
party to the foreign proceeding. These token nonparties include
American corporate affiliates of the foreign opposing party235 and
American law firms that have represented foreign clients in US
litigation.236 Most recently, the Second Circuit reversed a lower
court’s grant of a § 1782 petition ordering Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP to turn over documents in aid of litigation in the Netherlands.237 The reversal was based not on fears of interfering with
the foreign litigation but rather on concern that granting the request would undermine attorney-client communications in the
United States as well as confidence in protective orders.238 In the
absence of information from foreign courts, it is easier to locate a

234 See, for example, Order Granting Application in Part for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of Lúcia De Araujo Bertolla for an Order
Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No 1:17mc-00284, *2 (SDNY filed Nov 13, 2017) (“[T]he Discovery Targets are not parties in the
proceedings in Brazil and are not expected to become parties thereto, thus, the need for
this discovery is more apparent.”); Omnibus Report and Recommendations on Motions to
Intervene, Vacate, Quash Subpoenas, and for Protective Order, In re Application of H.M.B.
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings,
No 1:17-cv-21459, *17 (SD Fla filed July 2, 2018) (refusing to “look beyond the subpoenaed
party to ascertain the true target of discovery”) (emphasis in original). But see In the Matter of a Petition for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 by Macquarie Bank
Ltd, 2015 WL 3439103, *6 (D Nev) (arguing that the first discretionary factor “militates
against allowing § 1782 discovery when the petitioner effectively seeks discovery from a
participant in the foreign tribunal even though it is seeking discovery from a related, but
technically distinct entity”); Order, In re Application of Parmalat Brasil S.A. Industrial de
Alimentos and LAEP Investments, Ltd for an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Conduct
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No 1:11-mc-00077, *6 (SDNY filed July 26, 2011)
(Parmalat Application) (concluding that the first factor is neutral because “whether those
same documents are obtainable in Brazil is, at this juncture, unknown”).
235 See, for example, Bravo Express Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc,
613 F Appx 319, 320–21 (5th Cir 2015) (seeking discovery from US targets that had a
corporate relationship and joint business operations with the entities that were involved
in the underlying disputed acts); Application for an Order Directing ASML US, Inc. to
Respond to Requests for Documents Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 For Use in Foreign Proceedings, and Supporting Memorandum, In re Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782
of Nikon Corp, No 1:17-mc-00142, *8 (SDNY filed Apr 26, 2017) (seeking discovery from
the wholly owned subsidiary of the opposing party in the foreign action).
236 See, for example, In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d 294, 296 (SDNY
2003) (“Application of section 1782 does not involve an analysis of . . . why a respondent
has the documents.”); Ex Parte Application for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782
Granting Leave to Obtain Discovery from Quinn Emanuel for Use in Foreign Proceedings,
In re Ex Parte Application of Apple, Inc, No 5:12-mc-80124, *1 (ND Cal filed May 25, 2012).
237 See Kiobel by Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F3d 238, 241 (2d
Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S Ct 852 (2019) (noting that the sought-after documents were
sent by Shell to the United States “solely . . . for the purpose of American litigation”).
238 See id at 241, 246–47.
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domestic rationale than a foreign one for limiting a doctrine
whose primary effect is abroad.
Focusing on the nonparty status of the discovery target leads
to a particularly absurd result when the discovery that is sought
is in fact located abroad. While the drafters of § 1782 did not anticipate the statute to be used extraterritorially,239 some courts
have compelled discovery from the very country where the foreign
dispute is being adjudicated, because the FRCP reach documents
and other tangible things “in the possession, custody, or control”
of the discovery target.240 Such extraterritorial discovery is typically obtainable by the foreign court, and seeking it in the United
States should raise strong suspicions of the applicant sidestepping foreign discovery restrictions.
The second and third factors concerning receptivity and
whether a discovery request is an attempt to circumvent foreign
proof-gathering restrictions are often considered in tandem and
have resulted in a number of analytical shortcuts that effectively
write these factors out of existence. The most prominent among
them is burden shifting, since Intel did not specify burdens. Many
district courts have held that the target resisting discovery must
provide “authoritative proof” that the foreign court is not receptive.241 Authoritative proof of a negative is hard to come by,

239 See Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International
Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J Intl L & Commerce 1, 10–12 (1998) (noting that allowing such discovery is likely to interfere with foreign court processes while making the United States the “clearing house[ ]” for information
“all over the world”).
240 See Sergeeva v Tripleton International Ltd, 834 F3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir 2016)
(holding that § 1782 reaches “responsive documents and information located outside the
United States” so long as it is within the “possession, custody, or control of” the discovery
target); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F3d 520, 524 (2d Cir 2019) (holding that “there is no per
se bar to the extraterritorial application of § 1782”). See also FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). But see
Pinchuk v Chemstar Products LLC, 2014 WL 2990416, *4 (D Del) (quashing a discovery
request for documents located abroad).
241 There is a multiway split in the courts on the question of who bears the burden of
showing receptivity or the lack thereof. Compare Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v Chevron Corp,
619 F3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir 2010); Chevron, 633 F3d at 162 (holding that relevant evidence is “presumptively discoverable” unless the party opposing discovery shows offense
to the foreign jurisdiction); In re MTS Bank, 2017 WL 3155362, *6 (SD Fla) (“[C]ourts look
for authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid
of § 1782.”) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), with Foda v Capital Health,
2010 WL 2925382, *2 (ND Cal) (placing the burden of proof on the applicant); In re Application of Chevron Corp, 762 F Supp 2d 242, 252 (D Mass 2010) (noting that the targets of
foreign discovery requests “are often individuals plucked out of their repose who may . . .
not necessarily [have] the wherewithal to mount a defense to an application, let alone . . .
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particularly where the discovery target is a US nonparty to the
foreign litigation, who likely has no information about the foreign
tribunal adjudicating the dispute abroad. Other analytical
shortcuts that district courts have taken include: inferring that
membership in the Hague Evidence Convention signals receptivity to US discovery242 despite the fact that nearly all Convention
members have submitted a declaration objecting to pretrial discovery as such discovery is mandated by the FRCP;243 and relying
on prior federal court decisions concluding that a foreign country
is receptive without looking more deeply at how those courts arrived at their conclusion.244
The overarching result of these simplified tests is that district courts are reflexively granting foreign discovery requests because the comity-based discretionary factors are not gauging
whether exported US discovery is assisting or interfering with
foreign proceedings. Instead, appellate courts have instructed district courts that it is preferable to modify a request on the basis
that it is too burdensome rather than deny or quash a request
altogether.245 Information about the burden imposed by a discovery request is more readily available since it can be furnished by
the local US target of the discovery, providing another example of
how the absence of foreign courts and foreign parties in § 1782
proceedings results in domestic rationale driving a doctrine
whose primary effect is abroad. If all else fails, courts reason that
prove a negative, i.e., a foreign tribunal’s non receptivity to the discovery sought”) (emphasis in original), Department of Caldas v Diageo PLC, 925 F3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir
2019) (taking a “middle-of-the-road approach” that does not apply a rigid burden-shifting
framework); Order, In re Application of Digitechnic, No 2:07-cv-00414, *6–7 (WD Wash
filed May 8, 2007) (not placing the burden on either side).
242 See, for example, In re O’Keeffe, 646 F Appx 263, 266–68 (3d Cir 2016) (affirming
district court’s conclusion that Hague Evidence Convention being in effect between United
States and Hong Kong was sufficient indication that Hong Kong courts would be receptive
to American judicial assistance). See also In re Servicio Pan Americano de Protección, 354
F Supp 2d 269, 274 (SDNY 2004) (“Venezuela has indicated its receptivity to federal judicial assistance by its signature of treaties facilitating such cooperation.”).
243 See note 84 and accompanying text.
244 See, for example, Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Order to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, In re Ex Parte Application of ANZ Commodity Trading Party Ltd, No 4:17-mc-80070, *6 (ND Cal filed Aug 4, 2017) (relying on cases cited by
applicant in which US courts had previously granted foreign discovery requests from Hong
Kong to conclude that Hong Kong is receptive).
245 See, for example, Bravo Express, 613 F Appx at 325 (“[M]odification of a subpoena
is preferable to quashing it outright, and a district court abuses its discretion when it does
not explain its reasoning, does not allow the applicant an opportunity to cure any defects,
and does not attempt to modify the subpoena to cure any overbreadth.”) (quotation marks
omitted).
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the foreign tribunal can simply disregard the discovery compelled
by a US court,246 neglecting the judicial and private resources
wasted, as well as the fact that foreign countries lacking broad
discovery provisions typically do not have admissibility rules.
That judges usually do not have any information about what happens to discovery after they compel it for foreign use amplifies
this problem.
3. Undermining universal and American litigation values.
Not only are there inadequate safeguards for protecting
against compelling discovery that interferes with foreign litigation, the way in which foreign discovery requests are considered
also undermines universal notions of due process and fairness as
well as deeply held American litigation values. Federal courts are
typically permitted to hear “definite and concrete” controversies
affecting “the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”247 While ex parte proceedings can be a legitimate exercise of
Article III power, they pose potential risks to the rights of absent
parties.248 Accordingly, federal courts must be particularly vigilant about protecting those parties, and due process requires that
absent parties receive notice of proceedings that concern them, as
well as an opportunity to participate.249 Noncontentious jurisdiction ends, or at least must be moderated, where a judgment encroaches on the rights of parties not before the court. 250 Moderation may require judges to play a more active role, for instance by
conducting their own factual investigation and framing the legal
issues, since they cannot rely on an adverse party to do so.251
When foreign discovery requests proceed ex parte, they raise
all the alarms that ex parte proceedings usually do. The presence
of a nonparty target does not assuage these concerns, as nonparty
targets do not have the same interest in resisting discovery as

246 See, for example, Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 597 (“German judges can disregard
evidence that would waste the court’s time.”); In re Ex Parte Application of Nokia Corp,
2013 WL 6073457, *3 (ND Cal) (“[T]he German court can exclude evidence of marginal
probative value.”).
247 Aetna Life Insurance Co v Haworth, 300 US 227, 240–41 (1937).
248 See Pfander and Birk, 124 Yale L J at 1357 (cited in note 186).
249 See id at 1358.
250 See id at 1450 n 490 (noting that “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may
provide a more effective instrument for moderating non-contentious forms than a strict
adherence to an adverse-party rule that would foreclose the exercise of all judicial power
over such matters”).
251 See id at 1446.
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might the opposing party and often cooperate with the requestor,
agreeing to a joint protective order that protects the confidentiality
of the discovered materials instead of opposing the request itself.252 Sometimes the nonparty target even brings the application
on behalf of the foreign applicant.253 The foreign adversary
against whom the requested discovery is to be used is an obvious
absent party whose rights are affected. The adverse-party requirement articulated by the Supreme Court,254 the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and universal conceptions of fairness require that foreign adverse parties be notified of the proceeding and provided an opportunity to participate. Were the adverse parties located in the United States, these requirements
would be set out in FRCP 45. But because the adverse parties and
the plenary dispute is abroad, courts have not consistently applied any notification requirement, and, on the contrary, have
even debated whether the opposing adversary has standing to
participate.255
Although a foreign tribunal is not an absent party, compelled
discovery in the United States can also alter a foreign tribunal’s
ability to manage litigation before it. Notifying and involving the
foreign tribunal is justified on this ground. Moreover, it is the type
of factual investigation a US judge should undertake when faced
with an ex parte § 1782 request. Were the foreign tribunal a different district court in the United States, consultation with the
tribunal—and potentially also transfer of subpoena-related motions back to it—would be, respectively, encouraged and

252 See, for example, Order Granting Joint Motion for a Protective Order, In the Matter of Miasto Poznañ v Skarb Panstwa, No 1:15-mc-00179 (D Colo filed Jan 7, 2016). A
high degree of cooperation typically occurs when the nonparty target is a bank or social
media company that is willing to comply with the request but needs a § 1782 order to
justify compliance to the client whose information is being released. See also Neil A.F.
Popovic and Shin Hahn, Pursuing and Responding to Discovery Requests Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 (Lexology, Mar 29, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XD6Y-4R5D.
253 See, for example, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v Hourani, No 1:15-cv-01724, *2–4 (DDC filed Oct 19, 2015).
254 See Aetna Life, 300 US at 240–41.
255 Compare In re Kleimar N.V. v Benxi Iron and Steel America, Ltd, 2017 WL
3386115, *4 (ND Ill) (“[T]here is no question that an entity against whom the discovery
will be used has standing to challenge an order allowing discovery under § 1782.”), with
Order, In re Application of Chevron, No 1:10-mc-00001, *1 (SDNY filed Aug 24, 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs in the foreign proceeding for which discovery was sought, “whose
standing in this matter is debatable to say the least,” had moved to strike some of the
filings submitted by § 1782 applicant, who happened to be the defendant in the foreign
proceeding).
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permitted under FRCP 45. But because the tribunal is located
abroad, courts have, on occasion, precluded its participation.256
Without adversity and the typical due process accorded to
parties whose legal interests might be harmed, § 1782 proceedings are often characterized by unfairness and a lack of parity
between the parties to the foreign dispute. In Intel, the Supreme
Court instructed district courts to consider parity a “touchstone[ ]” for its exercise of discretion, and noted that a district
court could condition its grant of a discovery request on the applicant’s reciprocal exchange of information.257 Yet, compelling discovery in the United States conditioned on a reciprocal exchange
of information poses more problems than it solves. For one thing,
that reciprocal discovery is usually located abroad outside of the
jurisdiction of US courts, and requires district courts to effectively
order extraterritorial discovery that the foreign court could itself
order and thus is likely to be perceived as interference. 258 For another thing, when US discovery is sought from a nonparty to the
foreign dispute, there is no way for the district court to ensure
parity since the nonparty has no use for reciprocal discovery and
the adverse party is not before the court.
Moreover, district courts typically do not consider parity at
all, occasionally leading to inconsistent and unfair results within
the United States. In a set of three related foreign discovery requests spanning nearly a decade, two were granted to Heraeus
Kulzer, a German company, for use against its competitor Biomet
with which it was embroiled in litigation in both Germany and
Switzerland.259 Years later, a district court in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania denied a discovery request brought by Biomet for
use against Heraeus Kulzer in related litigation, a decision that

256 See, for example, Memorandum and Order, In re Application of Microsoft Corp,
No 1:06-mc-10061, *6 n 4 (D Mass filed Apr 17, 2006) (Microsoft Memorandum and Order)
(denying the European Commission’s motion to intervene on the grounds that its views
have already been received and represented by Novell, Inc, the nonparty target of the
§ 1782 request).
257 Intel, 542 US at 261–62.
258 See, for example, In re Application of Consorcio Minero, S.A. v Renco Group, Inc,
2012 WL 1059916, *4 (SDNY) (granting reciprocal discovery in Peru); Minatec Finance
S.À.R.L. v SI Group Inc, 2008 WL 3884374, *9 (NDNY) (granting reciprocal discovery located in Luxembourg).
259 See Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F3d at 595–99; Kulzer v Esschem, Inc, 390 F Appx 88, 89–
90 (3d Cir 2010).
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was later vacated in part due to parity concerns.260 In fact, foreign
parties regularly make not one but numerous discovery requests
in the United States, and since there is no requirement for applicants to inform district courts of related requests, it is difficult to
ensure consistency even across a single foreign proceeding. 261 This
is particularly so given the number of splits among the courts on
issues of law now plaguing § 1782.
Aside from undermining adverseness, due process, and parity between the foreign parties, the lack of information about the
underlying foreign proceeding also frustrates the usual discovery
analyses judges are expected to conduct. In particular, judges often have no reliable way of ascertaining whether the requested
discovery is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” 262 They do
not usually attempt any proportionality analysis. Many of the
proportionality factors are already difficult to gauge in the domestic
context, and entirely impossible to gauge in the international context without input from the foreign court and the foreign adversary. For instance, a US federal judge has no basis for understanding “the importance of the issues at stake in the action,”
which means the social, philosophical, or institutional significance of the substantive issues in the case263—matters bound up
260 See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switzerland GmBh, 742 F Appx at 699 (refusing to
accept Heraeus’s argument that Biomet’s discovery request should not be granted due to
potential exposure of trade secrets because “Heraeus [had] gained access to wide swaths
of Biomet’s potentially proprietary information through its own 1782 discovery requests
in the Northern District of Indiana and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania”).
261 See, for example, Astronics Advanced Electronics Systems Corp v Lufthansa Technik AG, 561 F Appx 605, 606 (9th Cir 2014) (discussing competing § 1782 requests from
adverse parties to the same foreign proceeding). But see Republic of Ecuador v Connor,
708 F3d 651, 658 (5th Cir 2013) (relying on judicial estoppel to prevent an applicant from
taking advantage of a circuit split).
262 FRCP 26(b)(1). See also, for example, Malak Application Order at *4 (cited in note
221) (“[T]he Court lacks any meaningful information with which to determine whether the
such [sic] discovery is relevant to the foreign proceeding.”); Order Re: Application for Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, MetaLab Design Ltd v Zozi International, Inc,
No 3:17-mc-80153, *6 & n 1 (ND Cal filed Jan 11, 2018) (concluding that the requested
evidence “may be relevant” to the requestor’s counterclaims, but noting in a footnote that
the court could not determine whether the applicant’s assertion that the discovery would
allow it “to defend the Canadian Action” was “in fact the case”); Alexander v Federal Bureau of Investigation, 194 FRD 316, 325 (DDC 2000) (changing the relevance standard to
include that which “bears on, or that [which] reasonably leads to other matters that could
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case”).
263 FRCP 26(b)(1). The proportionality analysis was originally introduced in 1983.
The corresponding committee notes explained that “the rule recognizes that many cases
in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters,
may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” FRCP 26, Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rules—1983 Amendment, Note to Subdivision (b).
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in the social fabric of the foreign country. Nor do they have much
visibility into the parties’ comparative resources or access to relevant information, or the importance of the discovery requested
in resolving the case. The fear that federal judges do not have
nearly as much facility with the facts as do the parties in a domestic discovery dispute264 is amplified many times over when
discovery is requested for a foreign dispute. Whether requested
discovery is relevant in foreign discovery requests is further complicated by the lack of information about whether it is possible for
US discovery to be put to any sort of use abroad. For all of these
reasons, some courts have noted that ex parte foreign discovery
proceedings undercut “evenhanded justice and a sense of fair
treatment”265 while making it more difficult for judges to make
decisions.266
IV. REIMAGINING GLOBAL DISCOVERY
The export of American discovery needs reform. Foreign discovery requests have been rapidly on the rise over the past decade
and a half, and foreign party requests, in particular, have exceeded tribunal requests in most recent years.267 The previous
Part laid out the many problems that arise when extending the
FRCP to the international context. The problems are mild when
district courts compel discovery at the request of foreign tribunals, and severe when they compel discovery at the request of foreign parties. Foreign parties now have a more direct relationship
with federal courts than do foreign tribunals, and they have made
more creative, heterogeneous, and dynamic use of § 1782.268
Meanwhile, federal judges are increasingly at an informational
disadvantage as they adjudicate foreign discovery requests with
little information about the plenary dispute abroad. This Part offers several proposals aimed at improving the operation of party
requests.
Beginning with the most straightforward and achievable reforms, I call for more active judicial management of § 1782 requests so that Intel’s discretionary factors can be sincerely

264 See Massen, 83 S Cal L Rev at 883 (cited in note 40) (noting that in the United States,
“litigants control most aspects of discovery while the judge’s role is limited to defining the
outer boundaries of the proof-gathering process while avoiding active participation”).
265 Merck & Co, 197 FRD at 270.
266 See Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Investment Vehicles, 798 F3d at 125.
267 See Part II.
268 See id.
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applied rather than merely paid lip service. To that end, I suggest
that federal courts systematically invite the participation of foreign tribunals and foreign opposing parties. Because these
changes are needed to follow the Supreme Court’s directives in
Intel, they can be adopted immediately by federal judges—as
some already have. But their consistent application across the
country will require the addition of a new Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure and moderate amendments to § 1782. This is particularly important given that over 60 percent of federal district courts
received foreign discovery requests during the study period.269
Next, I suggest restructuring foreign discovery requests such
that they are no longer treated as stand-alone actions in US
courts. Instead, requiring that all discovery requests related to
the same foreign proceeding be brought as a single unified US
action before the same federal judge will improve administrability, facilitate active judicial management, and reduce internally
inconsistent and unfair results.
A.

Seeking the Participation of Foreign Tribunals

The Supreme Court held in Intel that comity is a policy concern that district courts should address in their exercise of discretion. Accordingly, three of the four discretionary factors set out in
Intel are aimed at avoiding offense to foreign tribunals. Yet, the
European Commission opposed Intel’s prescription of case-bycase judicial discretion on the basis that a district court “can only
weigh fairly the complex interests of a foreign sovereign in aiding
or blocking a Section 1782 discovery request if it is made aware
of those interests.”270 “[S]o far as the Commission is aware,” it argued, “there is no system for providing it with notice of Section 1782 cases in which its interests are at stake, much less any
regular procedure through which the Commission might appear
and make those interests known.”271 The analysis above confirmed the European Commission’s suspicion that district courts
would not be able to discern the interests of foreign tribunals
without their input.
Meaningfully implementing Intel’s discretionary factors requires more active judicial management of foreign discovery requests by federal courts and more active participation from

269
270
271

See Part II.A.
European Commission Brief at *17 (cited in note 28).
Id.
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foreign tribunals. Federal judges can accomplish this by systematically providing written notice to foreign tribunals when § 1782
requests are received and sua sponte seeking the tribunals input.
District courts may specifically ask foreign tribunals to weigh in
on the Intel factors, to provide information needed to apply the
FRCP’s proportionality analysis, or to share scheduling information so that US discovery can be produced in time for it to be
taken into consideration abroad. As noted in Part II, many foreign
discovery requests are currently filed while the foreign litigation
is pending but reach no resolution because the foreign litigation
is resolved before the application is decided.272
Notification and consultation of foreign tribunals is even
more critical in those instances where evidence is requested for
multiple parallel proceedings occurring around the world. Recall
that approximately 28 percent of foreign party requests are for
evidence to be used in multiple foreign proceedings, which may
include a US proceeding.273 Even when additional foreign proceedings are not identified in the initial request, entrepreneurial litigants now use discovery obtained through § 1782 in multiple proceedings before multiple tribunals once the statute’s
requirements are deemed satisfied with respect to one foreign
proceeding.274 Each of those proceedings and their respective
courts or tribunals would be affected by compelled US discovery,
and their participation is needed to avoid confusion, duplication,
and abuse. In addition to whether US discovery should be compelled and on what timeline, courts will likely need to consult with
each other on issues of privilege and protective orders that would
subsequently limit the use of the materials produced. A joint protective order agreed to by the parties and approved by a court in
one jurisdiction will have externalities in other jurisdictions.
Some district courts have already begun taking a more active
stance toward foreign discovery requests. They have, for instance,
provided notice to foreign tribunals,275 corresponded directly with

272 See Appendix C, Table 14 (showing a steady number of cases every year that reach
no resolution).
273 See Part II.
274 See In re Accent Delight International Ltd, 869 F3d 121, 135 (2d Cir 2017) (holding
that § 1782 “does not prevent an applicant who lawfully has obtained discovery under the
statute with respect to one foreign proceeding form using the discovery elsewhere unless
the district court orders otherwise”).
275 See, for example, Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 of Financial
Guaranty Insurance Co v Lehman Brothers, Inc, No 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (SDNY filed Mar
29, 2011).
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foreign judges regarding compelled evidence,276 delayed their decision pending foreign court action,277 ordered and received status
reports on foreign proceedings,278 examined documents submitted
to foreign tribunals,279 and sought rulings from foreign courts.280
Some foreign tribunals have also started taking more active
part in § 1782 proceedings either directly or through private parties. The Korean Fair Trade Commission, for example, filed letters to the court in seven foreign discovery requests in the Northern District of California.281 These letters asserted that the
Korean Fair Trade Commission was not receptive to US discovery
related to disputes between Qualcomm and Apple. Similarly, the
European Commission sought to intervene and to file a memorandum in support of a motion to quash a § 1782 subpoena in the

276 See, for example, Letter from Paul A. Crotty, US District Judge, to Judge Enrique
Claudio González Meyenberg, In re Operación y Supervisión de Hoteles, S.A. de C.V.,
No 1:15-mc-00172 (SDNY filed Aug 12, 2015); Letter from Paul A. Crotty, US District
Judge, to Judge Enrique Claudio González Meyenberg, In re Operación y Supervisión de
Hoteles, S.A. de C.V., No 1:15-mc-00172 (SDNY filed Sept 4, 2015).
277 See, for example, Araujo Bertolla Request to File Under Seal at *3 (cited in note
211); Matter of the Application of Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Ltd, 2016
WL 5339803, *1 (ND Cal) (denying discovery as to one witness but stating that the court
may revisit the issue after the Australian court decides pending motion about discovery
from that witness); Order, In re Ex Parte Application of Banco Safra for an Order Pursuant
to 28 USC Section 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No 1:16-mc21971, *3–4 (SD Fla filed Sept 8, 2016) (giving respondents opportunity to obtain Brazilian
court decision regarding their asserted privileges and instructing them to submit a status
report regarding their prospective request for declaratory relief in Brazil); Parmalat Application at *5–8 (cited in note 234) (staying discovery request pending further action from
Brazilian court).
278 See, for example, Order Directing Mentor Graphics Corporation to File Status Report, In re Application of Mentor Graphics Corp, No 5:16-mc-80037, *1 (ND Cal filed June
15, 2016); Ching Chung Taoist Association, 2016 WL 5339803 at *3 (noting that the applicant provided notice to court regarding status of underlying foreign proceeding).
279 See, for example, Memorandum and Order on Petition for Discovery for Use in
Foreign Proceedings Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re Application of George W. Schlich,
No 1:16-mc-91278, *1–4 (D Mass filed Dec 9, 2016) (examining submissions from both
sides to the European Patent Office).
280 See, for example, Order, In re Application of Jurema Dimas de Melo Pimenta and
Dimas de Melo Pimenta Filho Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 For Judicial Assistance in Obtaining Evidence in This District, No 1:12-mc-24043, *1–2 (SD Fla filed Jan 29, 2013) (ordering movant to seek ruling or guidance from Brazilian court).
281 See, for example, Letter from Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc-80002, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016); Letter From
Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc80008, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016); Letter From Korea Fair Trade Commission, In re
Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc, No 5:16-mc-80005, *1 (ND Cal filed Jan 26, 2016).
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District of Massachusetts.282 In more than one instance, German
authorities weighed in against the production of evidence in the
United States,283 while in another instance, a German court not
only expressed receptivity to but postponed its own hearing to
permit a litigant to pursue discovery requests in Indiana and
Pennsylvania.284 A Swiss arbitrator has conveyed nonreceptivity
to US discovery,285 while an Israeli arbitrator has expressed receptivity to US discovery.286 Foreign litigants have also submitted
letters from judges in Monaco and Germany noting that they
would consider discovery compelled in the United States.287
These existing ad hoc attempts at fostering foreign tribunal
participation in § 1782 proceedings reveal that the needs of transnational discovery are not easily generalizable, for they are too
specific and fine-tuned to be addressed by blanket rules. A German judge may find US discovery assistance helpful in one proceeding but not in another. A broad-stroke solution covering an
entire country, or a type of foreign proceeding such as private
commercial arbitration, is unlikely to further the goal of
282 Motion of the Commission of the European Communities to Intervene, In re Application of Microsoft Corporation, No 1:06-mc-10061, *1 (D Mass filed Apr 6, 2006); Memorandum of the Commission of the European Communities in Support of Novell, Inc.’s
Motion to Quash, In re Application of Microsoft Corp, No 1:06-mc-10061, *1 (D Mass filed
Apr 6, 2006). The motion to intervene was denied on the basis that the European Commission’s views were already represented by the other parties. See Microsoft Memorandum
and Order at *6 n 4 (cited in note 256).
283 See In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d 294, 297 (SDNY 2003) (describing
the intervention by the German Federal Ministry of Justice); In re Winkler, 2005 US Dist
LEXIS 46937, *1–2 (SDNY) (same).
284 See Kulzer v Esschem, Inc, 390 F Appx 88, 92 (3d Cir 2010) (noting that although
the German court at issue could not itself order the sought-after discovery due to German
procedural rules, the court “does not restrict receipt of the evidence sought and in fact has
postponed a hearing scheduled for April 15, 2010 to September 30, 2010, specifically for
the purpose of permitting [the applicant] extra time to pursue its discovery requests in
Indiana and Pennsylvania”).
285 See El Paso Corp v La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F
Appx 31, 32 (5th Cir 2009) (“The arbitral tribunal issued an order expressing its views on
the § 1782 application, noting that it was not receptive to these discovery efforts.”).
286 See In re Hallmark Capital Corp, 534 F Supp 2d 951, 957 (D Minn 2007) (“[T]he
Israeli arbitrator has stated his ‘receptivity’ to this Court’s assistance.”).
287 See In re Application of Accent Delight International Ltd, 2016 WL 5818597, *2
(SDNY) (discussing that a magistrate judge in Monaco wrote that it was permissible for
two corporations to seek discovery in the United States and submit it in their proceeding
in Monaco); In re Application of Schmitz, 259 F Supp 2d at 299 (explaining that a presiding
judge of a Frankfurt district court filed a letter stating that “[i]f . . . documents from a US–
American proceeding are attached to a written statement in the case file, the Court will
take notice of this submission”). In In re Application of Schmitz, the Frankfurt judge later
changed his mind after finding out that the German Ministry of Justice had opposed it.
See Schmitz, 259 F Supp at 299.
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facilitating dispute resolution across borders. Instead, case-bycase participation is needed.
They also suggest that processes for notifying and including
foreign tribunals need to be systematized. A system of notification
and consultation can be implemented immediately through shifts
in judicial practice that federal appellate judges can enforce
through abuse of discretion review. To ensure their consistent application across the board, such notification and consultation
practices need to be codified through the addition of a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure specifically governing transnational
discovery requests.
Moreover, a system of notification and consultation requires
accompanying amendments to § 1782. The statute is currently interpreted to permit discovery requests related to suits that are
being contemplated and have yet to be filed.288 It should be
amended to preclude prefiling discovery, because coordination is
not possible when there is not yet a foreign tribunal presiding
over the foreign dispute. There are two rationales for prefiling
foreign discovery requests, neither of which is compelling. One is
that prefiling discovery is necessary due to many foreign legal
systems having higher pleading standards than the United
States, and so prefiling discovery is needed to file the suit abroad
in the first place. But a higher pleading standard does not justify
uncoordinated prefiling discovery because the pleading standard
may be a policy choice that reflects a desire to control discovery,
as it does in the United States.289 The other rationale is that prefiling discovery is necessary to maximize the chances that US discovery will be compelled in time for it to be used in the foreign
tribunal. The challenge of timing US discovery to suit the needs
of a foreign proceeding is a reason for better coordination, not for
broadening the reach of US discovery in hopes that some of it is
useful. Finally, extraterritorial discovery under § 1782 should be
explicitly precluded because no coordination is needed in that scenario. The foreign tribunal can order the discovery itself and a US
court should refrain from doing so, ostensibly in the tribunal’s aid.

288 See Intel, 542 US at 259 (holding that § 1782 “requires only that a dispositive ruling . . . be within reasonable contemplation”).
289 See Part III.A.
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Seeking the Participation of Foreign Parties

The Supreme Court additionally held in Intel that parity is a
policy concern that district courts should address in their exercise
of discretion. Yet, most § 1782 requests target nonparties to the
foreign proceeding and are considered ex parte, without the participation of the foreign opposing party. As noted in Part II, only
37 percent of party requests in 2015 were contested either by the
foreign opposing party or the nonparty target, and uncontested
requests were more likely to be granted than contested requests.
Whether the low contestation rate was due to lack of notice versus
failure to contest could not be determined from docket analysis.
Some courts no longer allow § 1782 requests to be considered
ex parte, but notification requirements are currently erratic and
need to be systematically applied.290 The foreign opposing party
should always be notified and given an opportunity to intervene.
The input of the foreign opposing party is needed to determine
whether parity is lost by the grant of US discovery, to uphold universal notions of due process and fairness, and to ascertain information regarding the foreign proceeding that is needed to apply
the FRCP. This information includes whether the requested information is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, the importance of the requested discovery to resolving the case, and the
parties’ comparative resources and access to relevant information. If granting the § 1782 request will unfairly benefit one
party at the expense of another, then the foreign tribunal’s involvement is also needed to enforce a reciprocal exchange of information.
Like the requirement to notify and consult the foreign tribunal, the requirement to notify and include the foreign opposing
party can be achieved initially through changes in judicial practices. To ensure consistency across the many district courts that
now receive § 1782 requests, this requirement should be codified
in the new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing transnational discovery requests.
C.

Improving Administrative Ease

In Part II, I noted that docket analysis provides incomplete
information about when multiple discovery requests are made in
the United States for the same foreign proceeding because each
foreign discovery request operates as its own stand-alone action.

290

See Part III.C.1.
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A single foreign proceeding might generate many discovery requests in different district courts and before different federal
judges who are not aware of the other requests. This splintered
structure makes foreign discovery requests uniquely difficult to
administer, including making it difficult to assess whether discovery requests are abusive, overly burdensome, or proportional
to the demands of the case.
Take, for example, the Chevron litigation and arbitration in
Ecuador concerning oil contamination in the Amazon. Chevron
filed over twenty-three § 1782 requests in district courts across
the United States,291 resulting in at least fifty federal court orders
and opinions.292 The indigenous plaintiffs and the government of
Ecuador filed many more. In one instance, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court’s denial of a discovery request made by
the government of Ecuador on the basis that the foreign arbitration for which the discovery was sought was not a tribunal covered by § 1782.293 Although the ruling was consistent with Fifth
Circuit precedent, the appellate court relied on judicial estoppel
to overturn the denial. Chevron had previously successfully argued before district courts in other circuits that the foreign arbitration was a tribunal covered by § 1782, and then taken advantage of a circuit split to argue the opposite in the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit became aware of these inconsistent positions
because the Chevron foreign discovery requests were highly publicized and most were opposed. But § 1782 requests typically are
not high profile and internally inconsistent results could easily
escape notice.
I recommend that foreign discovery requests related to the
same foreign proceeding be restructured to more closely resemble
domestic discovery requests. The unit of analysis should not be a
singular discovery request but rather a singular foreign proceeding. Like domestic discovery requests that are initially all directed to the same federal district court that oversees the plenary
dispute, foreign discovery requests related to the same foreign
plenary dispute should also, at least initially, all be directed to
the same federal district court. If some discovery is needed from
another district, the out-of-district request can be managed by a
compliance court, as it is in the domestic context under
291 See Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 Va J Intl L
127, 143 (2012).
292 See id. See also Chevron Corp v Naranjo, 667 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir 2012).
293 See Republic of Ecuador v Connor, 708 F3d 651, 657–58 (5th Cir 2013).
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FRCP 45.294 Having a central presiding judge is critical to seeing
the overall effect of US discovery on the foreign proceeding, even
if that judge is not presiding over the plenary dispute. Restructuring foreign discovery requests in this way also reduces the burden on foreign tribunals and foreign opposing parties who can
participate in a centralized way rather than in separate actions
across many district courts.
Restructuring will require § 1782 to be amended. A more
achievable but less effective short-term solution would be to require § 1782 applicants to report all other § 1782 discovery requests linked to the same foreign proceeding so that they may be
consolidated.
CONCLUSION
Despite their rapid growth in recent years, foreign discovery
requests remain a small fraction of the overall federal docket. 295
Yet, they provide a lens for understanding the broader shift toward disputes that straddle multiple legal systems and the challenges such disputes pose for courts and judges. At other procedural junctures, too, private actors are planning strategically
across borders while federal judges are operating at an informational disadvantage and engaging in the futile task of abstractly
divining foreign interests. For instance, scholars have criticized
federal courts for problematically dismissing transnational cases
in the name of comity through doctrines such as forum non conveniens and comity abstention296 even when foreign courts and
governments have not welcomed such dismissals.297
As private actors become more savvy and transnational cases
become more meaningfully connected to multiple fora, national
judges can no longer operate in a silo. They need to seek out the
participation of foreign parties because their decisions alter the
procedural rights of private actors abroad. They need to seek out
294

See Part III.A.
Toward the end of the study period (2013–2017), there were approximately two
hundred foreign discovery requests filed per year, see Appendix C, Table 5, whereas there
were 292,076 civil filings overall in federal district courts in 2017. See US Courts, Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017, archived at https://perma.cc/UUJ2-FY57.
296 See, for example, Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 Stan L Rev
1081, 1089, 1115–16 (2015) (describing these doctrines as “avoidance doctrines” and criticizing them for undermining US interests while driving plaintiffs to sue abroad).
297 See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 NYU L Rev 390, 394
(2017) (explaining that certain cases dismissed for forum non conveniens were not viewed
by the foreign tribunal as an act of comity but rather as an expression of protectionism).
295
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the participation of foreign tribunals because they share overlapping authority with foreign judges and arbitrators over certain
cases. Ultimately, a reconceptualization of US judges as partners
in global governance,298 engaged in the shared task of governing
a common transnational litigation space, is needed.
Global governance is defined as “the collective management
of common problems at the international level.”299 Transnational
litigation and discovery are now common international problems,
governed by many national and international courts and tribunals whose authorities are overlapping and nonhierarchical.300
When a foreign dispute leads to a § 1782 request, the foreign court
adjudicating the case and the US federal court receiving the discovery request both have authority over the case, potentially leading to confusion and discord. Recognizing that federal judges are
engaged in global governance reveals the forest from the trees:
individually, these foreign discovery requests are routine and low
profile; together, they give rise to a system of global governance
marked by institutional conflict and chaos.
This Article serves as a case study of a set of institutional
challenges that will only grow in the coming years, and an example of the type of institutional solutions that will be needed. It
calls for scholarship on judicial information sharing and coordination across borders,301 as well as a deeper understanding of the
diverse legal systems worldwide with which US courts will need
to coordinate.

298

Thanks to Bill Dodge for suggesting this turn of phrase.
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture *17 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/K8NQ-WRKH.
300 Political scientists have observed that particular issue areas are now governed by
“an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions,” which can in turn
lead to confusion and conflict. Karen J. Alter and Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International
Regime Complexity, 14 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 329, 333 (2018). See also generally Karen J.
Alter and Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 Perspectives
on Polit 13 (2009).
301 I explore this subject elsewhere. See generally Yanbai Andrea Wang, Procedural
Coordination Across Borders (unpublished manuscript, 2020) (on file with author).
299
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APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
I relied on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) system to compile a dataset of incoming foreign discovery requests for use in civil proceedings abroad.302 Other scholars
have noted the sampling bias stemming from empirical efforts
that rely on Westlaw or Lexis searches. Because Westlaw and
Lexis contain more published than unpublished orders, have varying completeness across district courts, and lack clarity on the
exact contents of their databases, searches on these services are
likely to yield biased results that do not reflect the overall reality
on the ground.303 These problems are amplified by different publication practices across district courts,304 and are particularly
worrisome for studying low-profile routine matters such as § 1782
discovery orders, which tend to be unpublished.
PACER is a mandatory electronic docketing system within
federal district courts that provides access to all filed actions nationwide. The process of moving to PACER’s electronic docketing
system began in 1988, and was mostly completed by the mid2000s.305 Since PACER has limited search functions and does not
allow text searching,306 I searched PACER’s contents on

302 PACER is a fee-based “electronic public access service that allows users to obtain
case and docket information online from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts,
and the PACER Case Locator.” See Administrative Office of the United States Court s,
Public Access to Court Electronic Records, archived at https://perma.cc/7GAV-95AX.
303 See, for example, Engstrom, 65 Stan L Rev at 1214–15 (cited in note 109) (discussing incompleteness in Westlaw’s and Lexis’s databases); Hoffman, Izenman, and
Lidicker, 85 Wash U L Rev at 686 (cited in note 109) (same). When I inquired about the
exact methodology by which Westlaw gathers its contents, a Westlaw reference attorney
explained: “We . . . obtain reported decisions from the court, we have employees who are
out acquiring non-published cases constantly and we receive request[s] to add cases from
customer and sales reps.” Email from Stephanie Zoet, Academic Account Manager, Thomson Reuters (July 28, 2017) (on file with author). In phone conversations with Westlaw
and Lexis representatives and reference attorneys, I was repeatedly told that the exact
methodologies by which they compile their respective databases are proprietary information that could not be shared. Both services declined to put me in touch directly with
members of their data team.
304 Engstrom, 65 Stan L Rev at 1215 (cited in note 109).
305 PACER was initially accessible at terminals in libraries and other designated locations and became available on the Internet in 2001. See Bobbie Johnson, Recap: Cracking Open US Courtrooms (The Guardian, Nov 11, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/
PZ8V-MFGX (noting that PACER was initially accessible at terminals in libraries and
other designated locations, and became available on the Internet in 2001); Engstrom, 65
Stan L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 109).
306 The PACER Case Locator allows searches by case number, title, party name, and
date range, but does not allow searches to identify cases for which this information is not
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Bloomberg Law. Bloomberg Law’s database includes docket coverage for all federal district courts since 1989.307 According to
Bloomberg Law representatives, the service contains all of
PACER’s content across that timespan, and continues to collect
docket information and filed documents on a rolling basis. Bloomberg’s Advanced Dockets Search allows text searches of all docket
reports as well as any underlying filed documents that have been
rendered text searchable.308
To compile as exhaustive as possible a dataset of incoming
foreign civil discovery requests, I took four steps. First, I crafted
and tested a variety of text search parameters for identifying foreign civil discovery requests. Since all foreign civil discovery requests and some foreign criminal discovery requests are ultimately executed under the authority of § 1782, the task was to
create a dataset of discovery requests brought under § 1782 during that time period, and then to exclude the criminal discovery
requests. I tested different text searches on Bloomberg Law by
cross-checking results for individual calendar years with cases
identified by Westlaw as citing § 1782 for that same time period.
When Westlaw only contained an appellate case, I looked for the
corresponding district court case in the Bloomberg Law search results. I chose to use Westlaw over Lexis for this step because
Westlaw is more inclusive.309 I adjusted the search terms until the
only cases that were missing could not be captured without also
pulling in domestic discovery disputes. In other words, I selected
the text search that maximized sensitivity without significant
sacrifices in specificity. The selected text search was:
“letter rogatory” OR “letters rogatory” OR “judicial assistance” OR “discovery in aid of international” OR “discovery
in aid of foreign” OR (28 /5 1782) OR (use /s “foreign

known. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, PACER Case Locator Advanced Case Search, online at https://pcl.uscourts.gov/pcl/pages/search/findCaseAdvanced.jsf
(visited May 1, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable).
307 See
Bloomberg Law, Bloomberg Law Docket Coverage, online at
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets/coverage/detail (visited May 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that Bloomberg contains records of proceedings for all federal
district courts from 1989 to the present).
308 Not all documents filed on PACER are text searchable (some are scanned as images), and the same goes for Bloomberg. There does not appear to be any pattern in which
documents are text searchable.
309 See Hoffman, Izenman, and Lidicker, 85 Wash U L Rev at 710 n 138 (cited in note
109) (noting that all opinions in Lexis were present in the Westlaw database, whereas
some opinions were in Westlaw but not in Lexis).
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proceeding”) OR (use /s “foreign proceedings”) OR (aid /s “foreign proceeding”) OR (aid /s “foreign proceedings”)
Second, on May 31, 2018, I ran the above text search on
Bloomberg Law on cases filed in all ninety-four federal district
courts between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2017. As discussed in Part II, these dates were selected to capture how courts
have treated foreign civil discovery requests during the years
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel. This initial search
produced over ten thousand results.
Third, since these results included many false positives that
were not § 1782 requests, they were manually culled, a process
that eliminated approximately two-thirds of the results, leaving
over three thousand true positives. All available information was
used to determine whether the case was a true § 1782 request,
including if it was labelled as such in the title or in the “cause”
field of the docket report. I did not include as true positives cases
that were unambiguously erroneous uses of § 1782.310 Because the
search terms I used included “letter rogatory” and “judicial assistance,” many of the initial results were outgoing discovery requests, seeking evidence from abroad for controversies being adjudicated in the United States. This manual culling was
completed with the assistance of a team of research assistants. I
spot-checked the results for accuracy.
Fourth, to ensure that the dataset is close to exhaustive and
unbiased, I cross-checked with cases identified by Westlaw as citing § 1782 for different calendar years than had been used to construct the text search. The results confirmed my expectations: I
missed less than 1 percent of cases identified by Westlaw, and I
could not have captured them without expanding the search
terms such that I would have lost a significant degree of specificity
in the overall result. There does not appear to be a pattern in the
types of § 1782 requests that are missing. They are missing because none of the search terms were mentioned in the docket report or in the text searchable underlying documents. I could not
detect any pattern in either the text labels entered into docket
reports or whether underlying filed documents were text searchable. I also confirmed that the dataset is close to complete and
unbiased by internally checking those cases that were refiled

310 See, for example, Order, Whitehead Clan Foreign Trust v Conway, No 2:14-mc00072, *1 (D Ariz filed Nov 21, 2014) (denying the request because the court could not
discern what the plaintiff was requesting).
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under a different case number or consolidated.311 Anytime I came
across one of these cases, I checked whether the refiled or consolidated case was also in the dataset. Finally, the dataset’s estimated number of tribunal requests coming from OIJA is in line
with the number of requests that OIJA itself estimates they are
sending to district courts.312
The dataset as a whole likely misses a few cases on the margins, but is close to exhaustive and unlikely to be biased. However, a cautionary note on the 2017 cases is in order: while Bloomberg Law representatives insist that the service regularly
updates dockets and pulls in new documents as they are filed,
that is not always accurate in my experience and in the experience of research assistants working on this project. Sometimes, it
is necessary to manually click an “Update Docket” button to fetch
the most recent documents. The result is that the text search was
likely run on some docket reports for 2017 that were not fully upto-date and may undercount the number of § 1782 requests in
that year. This problem did not seem to affect earlier years, likely
because those dockets had, over time, become updated either due
to Bloomberg Law clients manually updating those cases or by
the system’s automatic update mechanism. Additionally, some of
the 2017 cases may not yet have reached completion when the
text search was run on May 31, 2018, again leading to the search
being run on incomplete docket reports and possibly undercounting cases in 2017.

311
312

See Part II.A; Part III.C.1 (discussing refiled cases).
Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53).
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APPENDIX B: DATA CODING METHODOLOGY
Of the over three thousand true positive § 1782 requests in
the dataset, approximately one-third (over one thousand requests) were randomly selected for further coding for the following information. This coding was completed with the help of a
team of research assistants. We met weekly to discuss difficult
coding decisions and I spot-checked the results for accuracy. Some
cases were sealed overall or had underlying documents that were
sealed or otherwise unavailable. All available information was
used to make determinations, or data was recorded as missing.313
1. Civil or criminal: Some foreign criminal discovery requests
were previously executed under § 1782. Criminal discovery requests were coded as such and not examined further.
2. District court: We coded for the district court to which civil
discovery requests were made.
3. Requestor: We coded for who brought the request, whether it
was a tribunal, party, or interested person. If the request was
brought by a tribunal, we tracked whether the request came
directly to the district court, through the Department of Justice’s OIJA, or through a party. In some cases, requests were
brought by multiple entities.
4. Target: We coded for whether the request targeted a party, a
nonparty, or both.
5. Foreign tribunal type: We coded for the type of foreign tribunal
before which the requested discovery was to be used—whether
it was a foreign court, an international court, a regulatory
agency, a commercial arbitral tribunal, or an investor-state
arbitral tribunal. In some cases, requests indicated that the
evidence would be used in multiple tribunals.
6. Numerosity of foreign proceeding: We coded for whether the
evidence was requested for one foreign proceeding or multiple
foreign proceedings.
7. Timing of foreign proceeding: We coded for the timing of the
foreign proceeding for which the evidence was requested—

313 Neither I nor OIJA is aware of any pattern in which cases become sealed or have
missing documents. Ossenova Interview (cited in note 53).
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whether the foreign proceeding was pending, contemplated, or
mixed (if the evidence was requested for multiple proceedings).
8. Country of foreign proceeding: We coded for the country or
countries of the foreign proceeding(s) for which the evidence
was requested. I then also categorized the country in four
ways to look for patterns: by region, by Hague Evidence Convention status, by legal system type, and by rule-of-law score.
The categorizations are explained below.
a. Regions—The countries appearing in the dataset were categorized by the following regions:
i. Americas—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
ii. Caribbean—Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda,
Cayman Islands, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, British Virgin Islands, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
iii. Western Europe—Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, European Union, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Northern Ireland,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
iv. Eastern Europe—Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Russia
v. Middle East—Bahrain, Cyprus, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates
vi. Asia—American Samoa, Australia, China, Hong Kong,
India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Pakistan, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan
vii. Africa—Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, South Africa
b. Hague Evidence Convention status—The countries appearing in the dataset were categorized by whether the
Hague Evidence Convention was in force between that
country and the United States in the calendar year when
the case was filed. This may not be the same as whether
the country is a member of the Hague Evidence
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Convention. For example, although Brazil acceded to the
Hague Evidence Convention, the United States has not accepted its accession, so the Convention is not in force between Brazil and the United States. Below is a list of countries for which the Hague Evidence Convention was in
force with respect to the United States, including specific
calendar years if that statement only holds true for a segment of the study period. If the Convention came into force
between a country and the United States midway through
a calendar year, I counted it as being in force starting in
the following calendar year. Argentina, Australia, Barbados, China, Colombia (since 2013), Croatia (2010), Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary (since 2007), India (since
2007), Israel, Italy, South Korea (since 2010), Kuwait
(since 2009), Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco (since
2012), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Serbia (since 2012), Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
Venezuela.
c. Legal system type—The countries appearing in the dataset
were categorized by legal system type as follows:
i. Common law: Antigua, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados,
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jamaica, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom
ii. Civil law: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela
iii. Mixed/other: American Samoa, Bahrain, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guernsey, India, Iran,
Israel, Japan, Jersey, Kuwait, Liberia, Morocco,
Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, United Arab Emirates
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d. Rule-of-law score—The countries appearing in the dataset
in 2015–2017 were categorized by rule-of-law score quartile. To derive the quartiles, I used the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index,314 and only looked at scores from
2015 to 2017 because the scoring instrument varied with
each report during earlier years, whereas the scores are
more comparable during this three-year period.315 The index evaluates eight factors: constraints on government
powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement,
civil justice, and criminal justice. Although each country is
given a score as well as sub-scores for each factor, I only
relied on the overall composite score. The following is a list
of the countries in each quartile, with years if the country
was not in that quartile for the full three-year period. In
any given year, countries in the fourth quartile have the
highest rule-of-law scores, while those in the first quartile
have the lowest scores. Some countries in the dataset were
not scored by the World Justice Project, and so appear in
the “no score” category.
i. 4th Quartile: Australia, Austria, Barbados (2016), Belgium, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland
(2016, 2017), Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea,
Singapore, Slovenia (2016, 2017), Spain, St. Kitts and

314 Like other rule-of-law indexes, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators,
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index, and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of
Economic Freedom, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has been criticized for
conceptual and methodological problems. Without discounting or overlooking those problems, I use the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index as an imperfect way to generate
a rough picture of the types of legal systems with which federal district courts are interacting in foreign discovery requests, and whether that picture is different for foreign tribunal versus foreign party requests. See note 135.
315 Current & Historical Data (World Justice Project), archived at https://perma.cc/
S99Y-KY44:

[T]he construction of the indicators and the underlying survey instruments were
slightly revised with the publication of each report during those years. For these
reasons, we ask all users to use caution in comparing scores over time, though
it can be noted that indicator construction and WJP’s survey instruments have
remained relatively stable since 2015, so comparisons can be made with more
confidence from 2015–2020.
A spreadsheet of the current and historical data can be downloaded at the site.
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Nevis (2017), Sweden, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay
ii. 3rd Quartile: Antigua (2016, 2017), Argentina (2016,
2017), Bahamas (2016, 2017), Barbados (2017), Belarus (2015), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominica (2016, 2017), Georgia,
Ghana, Greece, Grenada (2016, 2017), Hungary, Italy,
Jamaica, Jordan, Macedonia (2015, 2016), Malaysia,
Mongolia, Nepal (2015), Panama (2015), Philippines
(2015), Romania, Senegal, Slovenia (2015), South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis (2016), St. Lucia (2016, 2017),
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2016, 2017), Trinidad
and Tobago (2016, 2017), Tunisia (2015, 2017), United
Arab Emirates
iii. 2nd Quartile: Albania, Argentina (2015), Belarus
(2016, 2017), Belize, Burkina Faso (2016, 2017), China,
Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire (2015, 2017), Dominican Republic (2015), El Salvador, Guyana (2016, 2017), India,
Indonesia, Iran (2017), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon (2015), Macedonia (2017), Malawi, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal (2016, 2017), Panama (2016, 2017), Peru,
Russia (2015), Philippines (2016), Serbia, Sri Lanka,
Suriname (2016, 2017), Tanzania (2015, 2016), Thailand, Tunisia (2016), Ukraine, Vietnam, Zambia
iv. 1st Quartile: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Burkina Faso (2015), Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote
D’Ivoire (2016), Dominican Republic (2016, 2017), Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran
(2015, 2016), Kenya, Lebanon (2016, 2017), Liberia,
Madagascar, Mexico, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines (2017), Russia (2016, 2017), Sierra Leone, Tanzania (2017), Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
v. No score: Andorra, American Samoa, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, European Union, Isle of Man, Israel,
Jersey, Kuwait, Monaco, Switzerland, Taiwan
9. Substance area of foreign proceeding: We coded for the substantive area in dispute in the foreign proceeding—whether it
was antitrust, bankruptcy, contract (generic contract that
does not fit into another category), corporate (disputes
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regarding corporate structure or breach of an officer’s fiduciary duty), environmental, employment, family (disputes regarding divorce, child custody, or inheritance), fraud (generic
fraud that does not fit into another category), maritime, intellectual property or trade secret, products liability, securities,
tax, tort (generic tort that does not fit into another category),
and other (any requests not covered by the above).
10. Number of docket lines: We coded for the number of docket
lines it took to resolve a request. This is a very rough gauge of
case complexity. Where a request was still pending, we did not
track this data.
11. Number of orders: We coded for the number of orders it took
to resolve a request. This is another very rough gauge of case
complexity. Where a request was still pending, we did not
track this data.
12. Outcome: We coded for the outcome of the request—whether
it was granted to some extent (including those that were
granted in part or subsequently quashed in part), denied altogether, or reached no resolution. Where an initial result was
later altered, we looked at the final outcome. A request
reached no resolution if it was withdrawn or otherwise terminated before a decision was made. Where a request was still
pending, we did not track the outcome.
13. Contestation: For 2015 cases only, we coded for whether the request was challenged. A request may be challenged by the target of discovery, whether party or nonparty to the foreign proceeding, or it may be challenged by the nontarget opposing
party. It may be challenged at the outset, or after a request is
initially granted ex parte. A challenge may take the form of a
motion to quash, motion to vacate, motion to stay, motion for
reconsideration, or a motion to compel from the requestor that
is opposed. I did not count entries of stipulated protective orders
or other requests for confidentiality agreements as contestation.
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 5: FOREIGN DISCOVERY REQUESTS EXECUTED UNDER
§ 1782, DATA SUMMARY, 2005–2017316

316
317

Year

Total number of cases

Cases sampled317

2005

290

102

2006

210

62

2007

275

97

2008

267

91

2009

218

70

2010

197

59

2011

212

72

2012

177

73

2013

233

82

2014

293

94

2015

237

98

2016

312

111

2017

239

81

Total

3160

1092

The year of a case is determined by the day on which it was filed.
I drew a random sample across the entire study period for detailed coding.
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TABLE 6: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN DISCOVERY
REQUESTS EXECUTED UNDER § 1782318
Civil Requests 319
Year

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Total

Criminal Requests

Refiled Requests

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

48.9

17%

238

82%

3.3

1.1%

34–72

12%–25%

218–256

75%–88%

1–15

0.34%–5.2%

63.4

30%

131

62%

15.8

7.5%

45–89

21%–42%

108–155

51%–74%

8–35

3.8%–17%

86.1

31%

179

65%

9.9

3.6%

66–112

24%–41%

156–203

57%–74%

5–25

1.8%–9.1%

108

41%

144

54%

14.4

5.4%

86–136

32%–51%

120–171

45%–64%

7–32

2.6%–12%

127

58%

87.9

40%

3.5

1.6%

105–150

48%–69%

68–113

31%–52%

1–17

0.46%–7.8%

135

69%

51.1

26%

10.9

5.6%

115–155

58%–79%

35–74

18%–38%

5–28

2.5%–14%

171

81%

34.8

16%

6.3

3%

154–186

73%–88%

23–54

11%–25%

3–19

1.4%–9%

151

86%

23.1

13%

2.6

1.4%

139–162

79%–92%

15–38

8.5%–21%

1–12

0.56%–6.8%

204

88%

17.5

7.5%

11.6

5%

190–216

82%–93%

10–33

4.3%–14%

9–26

2.6%–11%

247

84%

29.6

10%

16.5

5.6%

228–264

78%–90%

18–50

6.1%–17%

9–34

3.1%–12%

219

92%

7.7

3.3%

10.3

4.3%

208–228

88%–96%

4–19

1.7%–8%

6–22

2.5%–9.3%

240

77%

33

11%

39

12%

219–260

70%–83%

22–52

7.1%–17%

27–59

8.7%–19%

208

87%

3.1

1.3%

27.6

12%

193–222

81%–93%

1–14

0.42%–5.9%

17–46

7.1%–19%

2070

65%

919

29%

172

5.4%

1993–2147

63%–68%

848–996

27%–32%

139–214

4.4%–6.8%

318 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals.
319 There is a very small number of requests associated with both underlying civil
claims and related criminal proceedings or investigations. These mixed requests comprise
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TABLE 7: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY MOST
COMMON RECEIVING COURT320
Court
New York Southern
Florida Southern
California Northern
California Central
Florida Middle

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

272

23%

218–342

18%–28%

124

10%

91–173

7.6%–14%

94.1

7.8%

67–137

5.6%–11%

84

7%

58–124

4.8%–10%

47.1

3.9%

30–78

2.5%–6.5%

TABLE 8: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY
REQUESTOR314, 321
Requestor
Tribunal
Direct
Via DOJ
Via Party
Party
Interested Person

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

912

44%

817–1016

39%–49%

22.4

1.1%

13–44

0.63%–2.1%

832

40%

741–933

36%–45%

57.6

2.8%

39–88

1.9%–4.3%

1142

55%

1038–1255

50%–61%

16

0.77%

8–35

0.39%–1.7%

2 percent of the sample and were distributed across years. Because this Article focuses on
civil requests, I include these mixed cases in the civil requests group.
320 Since the random sample was drawn without replacement from a finite population
of comparable size, I modeled it as a random draw from a hypergeometric random variable
and used this distribution to calculate 95 percent confidence intervals.
321 Where a request came from both a tribunal and another entity, I counted it as a
tribunal request. Where the request came from both a party and an interested person, I
counted it as a party request. I applied these rules because the Supreme Court instructed
judges to gauge foreign tribunal receptivity, which judges can do as long as the foreign
tribunal is one of the requestors. See Intel, 542 US at 264–65.
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TABLE 9: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY TARGET322
Requests from Foreign Tribunals
Target

Party
Nonparty
Both

Requests from Foreign Parties

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

132

15%

101

8.4%

97–183

11%–20%

72–134

6%–12%

774

85%

1059

88%

684–874

75%–96%

959–1166

80%–97%

3.3

0.36%

40.5

3.4%

1–17

0.11%–1.9%

25–70

2.1%–5.8%

TABLE 10: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY TYPE OF
FOREIGN TRIBUNAL322, 323
Foreign

Requests from Foreign Tribunals

Requests from Foreign Parties

Tribunal

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage
95% CI

Type

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

Foreign

897

99%

1078

90%

Court

816–982

90%–100%

979–1184

82%–97%

Commercial

3.2

0.35%

119

9.9%

Arbitration

1–17

0.11%–1.9%

87–167

7.2%–14%

Regulatory

9.6

1.1%

47.6

4%
2.5%–6.6%

Agency

4–27

0.44%–3%

30–79

Investor-state

0

0%

30.6

2.5%

Arbitration

0–11

0%–1.2%

18–57

1.5%–4.7%

International

0

0%

3.4

0.28%

Court

0–11

0%–1.2%

1–18

0.083%–1.5%

322 To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric
distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example)
tribunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals.
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This
method errs on the side of wider-than-necessary confidence intervals.
323 Where a request came from more than one tribunal type, it was counted toward
both categories, which is why the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. I double
counted because each tribunal type is independently significant.
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TABLE 11: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY NATURE
OF FOREIGN PROCEEDING324
Nature of

Requests from Foreign Tribunals

Requests from Foreign Parties

Foreign

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

Proceeding

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

95% CI

Timing of Foreign Proceeding
Pending
Contemplated
Mixed

907

100%

1009

84%

830–987

91%–100%

909–1117

76%–93%

0

0%

121

10%

0–11

0%–1.2%

89–169

7.4%–14%

3.2

0.35%

70.6

5.9%

1–17

0.11%–1.9%

48–108

4%–9%

Number of Foreign Proceedings for Which Was Discovery Requested
One
Multiple

907

100%

864

72%

830–987

91%–100%

766–973

64%–81%

3.2

0.35%

336

28%

1–17

0.11%–1.9%

275–413

23%–34%

TABLE 12: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CIVIL REQUESTS BY MOST
COMMON AREA OF FOREIGN DISPUTE324, 325
Requests from Foreign Tribunals
Area
Family
Contract
Employment

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

478

52%

397–574

44%–63%

140

15%

101–197

11%–22%

106

12%

74–156

8.1%–17%

Requests from Foreign Parties
Area
Contract
Patent/IP
Corporate

Number

Percentage

95% CI

95% CI

327

27%

266–404

22%–34%

230

19%

181–296

15%–25%

148

12%

111–201

9.2%–17%

324 To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals, I first used the hypergeometric
distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example)
tribunal requests in the overall population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a
second time to estimate how many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals.
I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This
method errs on the side of wider-than-necessary confidence intervals.
325 Where the dispute in the foreign proceeding touched on multiple substance areas,
I counted them toward all applicable categories.
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TABLE 13: ESTIMATED COMPLEXITY OF CIVIL REQUESTS326
Requests from Foreign Tribunals
Year

Median Docket

Median Orders

Median Docket

Median Orders

Lines

95% CI

Lines

95% CI

95% CI
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Overall

Requests from Foreign Parties

95% CI

5

1

6

1

3–32

1–9

2–40

1–10

3

2

11

3

3–18

1–4

4–40.5

1–8

3

1

4

1

3–3

1–1

3–33

1–7

4

1

20

4

2.5–5.5

1–2

9.5–39.5

2.5–8.5

4

1

17.5

4

3–5

1–1.5

7–22

2–7

3.5

1

21

4.5

2.5–5

1–2

9–53

2.5–12

3

1

9

2

2–3

1–1

6–19

2–4

3

1

11

4

3–4

1–1.5

8–21

2–5

3

1

11

3

3–4.5

1–1

8–19

2–3

3

1

11

4

3–4

1–1

7–18

2–5

4

1

9

2

3–4

1–1

6–15

2–4

3

1

13

4

3–4

1–1

8–21

3–5

4

1

11

3

3–4

1–2

7–20

2–4

3

1

11

3

3–4

1–1

9.5–13

3–4

326 I calculated these 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent quantiles for the median using
bootstrap resampling (ten thousand bootstrap samples per interval).

2172

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:2029

TABLE 14: OUTCOME FOR SAMPLED CIVIL REQUESTS327
Requests from Foreign Tribunals
Year

Requests from Foreign Parties

Granted

Denied

No Res.

Granted

Denied

No Res.

No. (%)

No. (%)

No. (%)

No. (%)

No. (%)

No. (%)

9 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

5 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

2006

4 (80%)

1 (20%)

0 (0%)

8 (80%)

2 (20%)

0 (0%)

2007

18 (95%)

0 (0%)

1 (5%)

6 (86%)

0 (0%)

1 (14%)

2008

11 (92%)

0 (0%)

1 (8%)

10 (56%)

3 (17%)

5 (28%)

2009

19 (86%)

1 (5%)

2 (9%)

13 (93%)

1 (7%)

0 (0%)

2010

11 (92%)

0 (0%)

1 (8%)

16 (64%)

4 (16%)

4 (20%)

2011

14 (82%)

1 (6%)

2 (12%)

26 (72%)

5 (14%)

5 (14%)

2012

20 (91%)

1 (5%)

1 (5%)

25 (74%)

3 (9%)

6 (18%)

2013

25 (96%)

0 (0%)

1 (4%)

30 (73%)

4 (10%)

7 (17%)

2014

33 (97%)

0 (0%)

1 (3%)

28 (72%)

6 (15%)

5 (13%)

2015

35 (90%)

0 (0%)

4 (10%)

37 (80%)

2 (4%)

7 (15%)

2016

38 (93%)

1 (2%)

2 (5%)

26 (67%)

9 (23%)

4 (10%)

2017

25 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

34 (83%)

2 (5%)

5 (12%)

Overall

262 (93%)

5 (2%)

16 (6%)

264 (75%)

41 (12%)

49 (14%)

2005

327 This table represents the outcome of foreign civil discovery requests in the randomly drawn sample.
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TABLE 15: ESTIMATED GRANT RATES FOR CIVIL REQUESTS328
Year

Grant Rate

95% CI

2005

92.9%

69.6%—97.8%

2006

81.3%

57.1%—95.2%

2007

100%

87.5%—100%

2008

87%

68.7%—96.4%

2009

93.9%

81.9%—98.3%

2010

87.5%

73.5%—95.7%

2011

87%

75.7%—93.9%

2012

91.8%

82.9%—96.9%

2013

93.5%

86.2%—97.8%

2014

91.2%

83.2%—96%

2015

97.3%

92.1%—99%

2016

86.5%

78.4%—92.3%

2017

96.8%

90.1%—99%

Tribunal Requests 2005–2017

98.1%

96.1%—99.3%

Party Requests 2005–2017

86.6%

82.9%—89.6%

All Requests 2005–2017

91.9%

89.7%—93.6%

328 This table shows grant rates in the sampled foreign civil discovery requests, calculated as the number of granted requests divided by the number of granted requests plus
the number of denied requests. To calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals for tribunal and party requests, I first used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate a 95 percent confidence interval for the number of (for example) tribunal requests in the overall
population. I then used the hypergeometric distribution a second time to estimate how
many requests of this particular sort were made by tribunals. I took a conservative approach and used the lower bound for the number of tribunal requests to calculate the lower
bound for the number of requests made by tribunals, etc. This method errs on the side of
wider-than-necessary confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 4: SHANNON’S ENTROPY, CALCULATED ON MIXTURE OF
COUNTRIES FOR CIVIL REQUESTS329

329 Shannon’s Entropy has been used in varied contexts to measure the diversity of
populations. It captures both “richness” (the number of different categories within a population) and “evenness” (the equiprobability of randomly drawing any particular category). The more categories (here, countries) there are in a population, and the more evenly
the population is divided across those categories, the higher Shannon’s Entropy.

